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### 1

Deterrence DA

#### NFU makes nuclear primacy inoperative – first-strike threats define primacy

**Lieber and Press, Notre Dame and Dartmouth political science professors, 2006**

(Keir and Daryl, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy”, Foreign Affairs, March/April, ebsco, ldg)

During the Cold War, Washington relied on its nuclear arsenal not only to deter nuclear strikes by its enemies but also to deter the Warsaw Pact from exploiting its conventional military superiority to attack Western Europe. It was primarily this latter mission that made Washington rule out promises of "no first use" of nuclear weapons. Now that such a mission is obsolete and the United States is beginning to regain nuclear primacy, however, Washington's continued refusal to eschew a first strike and the country's development of a limited missile-defense capability take on a new, and possibly more menacing, look. The most logical conclusions to make are that a nuclear-war-fighting capability remains a key component of the United States' military doctrine and that nuclear primacy remains a goal of the United States.

#### Perception of declining U.S. deterrence causes fast, global. great power nuclear war

**Caves, NDU senior fellow, 2010**

(John, “Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent”, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=112063>, ldg)

Perceptions of a compromised U.S. nuclear deterrent as described above would have profound policy implications, particularly if they emerge at a time when a nuclear-armed great power is pursuing a more aggressive strategy toward U.S. allies and partners in its region in a bid to enhance its regional and global clout. A dangerous period of vulnerability would open for the United States and those nations that depend on U.S. protection while the United States attempted to rectify the problems with its nuclear forces. As it would take more than a decade for the United States to produce new nuclear weapons, ensuing events could preclude a return to anything like the status quo ante. The assertive, nuclear-armed great power, and other major adversaries, could be willing to challenge U.S. interests more directly in the expectation that the United States would be less prepared to threaten or deliver a military response that could lead to direct conflict. They will want to keep the United States from reclaiming its earlier power position. Allies and partners who have relied upon explicit or implicit assurances of U.S. nuclear protection as a foundation of their security could lose faith in those assurances. They could compensate by accommodating U.S. rivals, especially in the short term, or acquiring their own nuclear deterrents, which in most cases could be accomplished only over the mid- to long term. A more nuclear world would likely ensue over a period of years. Important U.S. interests could be compromised or abandoned, or a major war could occur as adversaries and/or the United States miscalculate new boundaries of deterrence and provocation. At worst, war could lead to state-on-state employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on a scale far more catastrophic than what nuclear-armed terrorists alone could inflict.

#### Nuclear deterrence key to global stability-key to prevent CBW’s and EMP attacks that kill millions and collapse the economy.

**Schneider, National Institute for Public Policy, 2008**

(Mark, “The Future of the US nuclear deterrent”, Comparative Strategy 27.4, ebscohost, ldg)

Today, the United States, the world’s only superpower with global responsibilities, is the only nuclear weapons state that is seriously debating (admittedly largely inside the beltway) about whether the United States should retain a nuclear deterrent. By contrast, the British Labour Government has decided to retain and modernize its nuclear deterrent. In every other nuclear weapons state—Russia, China, France, India, Pakistan, and allegedly Israel—there is general acceptance of the need for a nuclear deterrent and its modernization. Amazingly, the United States is the only nuclear-armed nation that is not modernizing its nuclear deterrent. Distinguished former leaders such a George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, despite the manifest failure of arms control to constrain the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat, call for “A world free of Nuclear Weapons” because “. . . the United States can address almost all of its military objectives by non-nuclear means.”1 This view ignores the monumental verification problems involved and the military implication of different types of WMD—chemical and biological (CBW) attack, including the advanced agents now available to potential enemies of the United States and our allies. A U.S. nuclear deterrent is necessary to address existing threats to the very survival of the U.S., its allies, and its armed forces if they are subject to an attack using WMD. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch wrote in The Wall Street Journal, “However, the goal, even the aspirational goal, of eliminating all nuclear weapons is counterproductive. It will not advance substantive progress on nonproliferation; and it risks compromising the value that nuclear weapons continue to contribute, through deterrence, to U.S. security and international stability.”2 Why can’t the United States deter WMD (nuclear, chemical, biological) attack with conventional weapons? The short answer is that conventional weapons can’t deter a WMD attack because of their minuscule destructiveness compared with WMD, which are thousands to millions of times as lethal as conventional weapons. Existing WMD can kill millions to hundreds of millions of people in an hour, and there are national leaders who would use them against us if all they had to fear was a conventional response. The threat of nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack, as assessed by a Congressional Commission in 2004, is so severe that one or at most a handful of EMP attacks could demolish industrial civilization in the United States.3 The view that conventional weapons can replace nuclear weapons in deterrence or war fighting against a state using WMD is not technically supportable. Precision-guided conventional weapons are fine substitutes for non-precision weapons, but they do not remotely possess the lethality of WMD warheads. Moreover, their effectiveness in some cases can be seriously degraded by counter-measures and they clearly are not effective against most hard and deeply buried facilities that are associated with WMD threats and national leadership protection. If deterrence of WMD attack fails, conventional weapons are unlikely to terminate adversary WMD attacks upon us and our allies or to deter escalation. Are there actual existing threats to the survival of the United States? The answer is unquestionably “yes.” Both Russia and China have the nuclear potential to destroy the United States (and our allies) and are modernizing their forces with the objective of targeting the United States.4 China is also increasing the number of its nuclear weapons.5 Russia is moving away from democracy, and China remains a Communist dictatorship. A number of hostile dictatorships—North Korea, Iran, and possibly Syria—have or are developing longer-range missiles, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.6 They already have the ability to launch devastating WMD attacks against our allies and our forward deployed forces, and in time may acquire capabilities against the United States. Iran will probably have nuclear weapons within approximately 2 to 5 years.7 The United States already faces a chemical and biological weapons threat despite arms control prohibitions. Due to arms control, we do not have an in-kind deterrent. Both Iranian and Syria acquisition of nuclear weapons could be affected by sales from North Korea, which have been reported in the press.8

### 2

Topicality

#### The aff is not topical --- introducing armed forces only refers to human troops, not weapons systems such as nuclear weapons --- prefer our interpretation because it’s based on textual analysis, legislative history, and intent of the WPR

Lorber 13 – Eric Lorber, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science. January 2013, "Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?" University of Pennsylvania Journal of Contsitutional Law, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961, lexis nexis

As is **evident from a** textual analysis, n177 an examination of the legislative history, n178 and **the broad** policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, n179 [\*990] "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government." n180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that **only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR.** Though not dispositive, **the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization.** n181 Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces." n182 By using inclusionary - as opposed to exclusionary - language, one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that **expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (**such as non-members **constituting armed forces)**. n183 Second, the term "member" does not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces" refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.¶ **An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed forces**. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central [\*991] Intelligence Agency). n184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback, n185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces" centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones, n186 suggesting that **Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S. combat troops.**¶ **The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities**. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191

#### Vote negative for predictable limits --- nuclear weapons is a whole topic on its own --- requires research into a whole separate literature base --- undermines preparedness for all debates.

### 3

Trade Promotion Authority

#### The President of the United States should substantially increase lobbying and persuasion efforts, using available political resources, on behalf of Congressional enactment of Trade Promotion Authority.

#### Obama applying PC is key to TPA and TPP---key to US leadership in Asia

**Barfield, AEI resident scholar, 3-4-14**

(Claude, “Domestic politics slow down Obama’s ‘fast track’ plan to free trade”, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/03/04/domestic-politics-slow-down-obamas-fast-track-plan-to-free-trade/>, ldg)

Symbolically, however, it is the TPP negotiations and the drive to conclude these negotiations expeditiously that stands as the focal point of the pivot. A successful TPP and the resulting benefits to US businesses and workers will form the economic anchor to persuade Congress and the public that Asia’s security and economic well-being is inextricably linked to US security and prosperity. There are now 12 Asia Pacific nations negotiating the TPP, with another, South Korea, standing in the wings. The membership (adding South Korea) represents over 40 per cent of world GDP and more than a third of total world trade. Substantively, the TPP aims to create a ‘gold standard’ agreement: meaning that it will set the standard for a 21st century trade regime, including rules for services and investment, intellectual property, health and safety, state-owned enterprises, regulatory transparency and due process, labour and the environment. The key tradeoffs will include balancing the 21st century demands of the US and others against the more traditional 20th century priorities of developing TPP nations in areas like textiles, clothes, shoes, sugar, cotton and dairy products. The TPP has reached endgame negotiations, where all twelve nations are expected to finally put their bottom line positions on the table. And it is here at this crucial juncture that US domestic politics have crashed the party with as yet incalculable consequences. In his State of the Union address, President Obama called upon Congress to give him so-called trade-promotion authority (expedited rules for Congress to ratify FTAs) in order to conclude the TPP and move forward on parallel negotiations with Europe. Within 24 hours of Obama’s plea, the Democratic majority leader Harry Reid defied the president by signalling opposition to granting trade-promotion authority and warning the administration not to send up such a bill. In the ‘all politics is local’ tradition, Reid’s eye is focused narrowly on holding the Senate in the midterm elections and retaining key support from union and environmental groups who strongly oppose the TPP. This leaves the ball squarely in Obama’s court: he must quickly decide whether to tackle Reid head on and mobilise other Democratic senators against their own majority leader — or attempt to get an ironclad agreement from Reid to allow a vote on TPP in a lame duck session after the election. He must also forge an alliance with congressional Republicans who — whatever Reid decides — will provide the majority of votes for TPP in both houses of Congress. Other TPP nations will be closely monitoring the administration’s decisions and Congress’ in coming weeks — as a guide to their own negotiating positions. The outcome of this debate and political battle will have far-reaching consequences. The failure of the US to continue to lead in a successful conclusion of the TPP would likely destroy the possibility of a broader US-led and anchored Trans-Pacific regional economic structure. In its place, the Chinese are already assiduously pushing for a narrower East Asian architecture that does not include the US. And well beyond the economic consequences, future US diplomatic and security leadership and alliances in Asia will be severely jeopardised as US regional allies come to doubt its ability to overcome local forces in order to pursue vital national interests.

#### The plan expends capital on a separate war powers issue–it’s immediate and forces a trade-off

O’Neil-prof law Fordham-7 (David – Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, “The Political Safeguards of –Executive Privilege”, 2007, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1079, lexis)

a. Conscious Pursuit of Institutional Prerogatives The first such assumption is belied both by first-hand accounts of information battles and by the conclusions of experts who study them. Participants in such battles report that short-term political calculations consistently trump the constitutional interests at stake. One veteran of the first Bush White House, for example, has explained that rational-choice theory predicts what he in fact experienced: The rewards for a consistent and forceful defense of the legal interests of the office of the presidency would be largely abstract, since they would consist primarily of fidelity to a certain theory of the Constitution... . The costs of pursuing a serious defense of the presidency, however, would tend to be immediate and tangible. These costs would include the expenditure of political capital that might have been used for more pressing purposes, [and] the unpleasantness of increased friction with congressional barons and their allies. n182 Louis Fisher, one of the leading defenders of the political branches' competence and authority to interpret the Constitution independently of the courts, n183 acknowledges that politics and "practical considerations" typically override the legal and constitutional principles implicated in information disputes. n184 In his view, although debate about congressional access and executive privilege "usually proceeds in terms of constitutional doctrine, it is the messy political realities of the moment that usually decide the issue." n185 Indeed, Professor Peter Shane, who has extensively studied such conflicts, concludes that their successful resolution in fact depends upon the parties focusing only on short-term political [\*1123] considerations. n186 When the participants "get institutional," Shane observes, non-judicial resolution "becomes vastly more difficult." n187

#### Leadership key to prevent Asian war

**Goh, University of Oxford International Relations lecturer, 2008**

(Evelyn, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, "Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order," irap.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/3/353.full, ldg)

The centrality of these mutual processes of assurance and deference means that the stability of a hierarchical order is fundamentally related to a collective sense of certainty about the leadership and order of the hierarchy. This certainty is rooted in a combination of material calculations – smaller states' assurance that the expected costs of the dominant state conquering them would be higher than the benefits – and ideational convictions – the sense of legitimacy, derived from shared values and norms that accompanies the super-ordinate state's authority in the social order. The empirical analysis in the next section shows that regional stability in East Asia in the post-Second World War years can be correlated to the degree of collective certainty about the US-led regional hierarchy. East Asian stability and instability has been determined by U.S. assurances, self-confidence, and commitment to maintaining its primary position in the regional hierarchy; **the perceptions** and confidence **of regional states about US commitment**; and the reactions of subordinate states in the region to the varied challengers to the regional hierarchical order. 3 Hierarchy and the United States in East Asia after 1945 The U.S.' involvement has had a profound impact on [the] history of East Asia's development. America maintained an ‘open-door’ to China, twice transformed Japan, and spilt blood to hold the line against aggression and communism. The U.S. constructed and maintained the post-World War II international order that allowed East Asia to flourish. America's victory in the Cold War and its technology driving the new economy are continued influences. In the strategic sense, therefore, the U.S. is very much a part of East Asia. It has been, and still is, a **positive force for stability and prosperity**.5 The United States has been indisputably the preponderant power in East Asia since 1945. Throughout much of post-war Asia, it has largely been acknowledged as the central, or dominant, state with no local territorial ambitions. Washington's key allies which institutionalize this benign view through their defense treaties, but unallied countries such as those in Southeast Asia, and, more recently India, also see it as an honest broker and offshore balancer (Goh, 2000; Layne, 1997). The communist countries in the region, which have experienced containment, subversion, and invasion by US forces, have good reason to disagree. But even China has accepted the idea of the United States as a stabilizing force in the region since the 1970s.6 Certainly, this is less controversial a claim than that of other scholars who have argued for such a dominant position for China (Acharya, 2003/04). The United States has also been intimately involved in key regional conflicts in East Asia after 1945. It intervened crucially on the side of the Allied powers to win the war, and was a core player in the peace settlement for the Pacific theatre, especially in the occupation and rehabilitation of Japan. During the Cold War, Washington intervened in hot wars and led in containing communism, and after the Cold War, it has been critical in managing the main regional conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Straits.7 Indirectly, it has provided a regional security umbrella, which may have dampened or limited the regional effects of other bilateral or domestic conflicts, such as the South China Sea territorial disputes.8 The United States has also earned it dominant position at the top of the East Asian hierarchy because of its critical economic role, in providing vital market access to Japan and the other Asian ‘tiger’ economies for their remarkable development, and in continuing to provide significant investments to the region. Its socio-economic and political model has become even more attractive in the region after the dissolution of the Soviet model at end of the Cold War. In every way, the United States is the preponderant power and gatekeeper of the great power club. Furthermore, the US-led hierarchy in East Asia since 1945 reflects our expectations of regional strategic behavioral in such an order. First, the centrality of acquiescence by subordinate states is clear: most of the main Asian states, with the partial exception of China, are either US allies or are cultivating closer security relations with Washington. As discussed below, even China today is not challenging but accommodating the interests of United States in the region. Second, the East Asian security order has been most unstable when the United States' commitment to the region and thus its position at the top of the hierarchy was uncertain and/or challenged. The following analysis traces the East Asian security order through three periods after the Second World War. In the 1945–70 period, the United States consolidated its post-war dominance in the region and established a hierarchy of non-Communist bulwark states, and regional order was stable in spite of Communist challenges. After 1970, as China and the Soviet Union exerted more regional influence in the wake of the post-Vietnam American drawdown, the US preponderance was challenged and the regional hierarchical order destabilized as subordinate powers jostled for position and adopted a range of balancing and insurance policies. After the end of the Cold War, Asia's security order has been evolving again, with smaller states trying to bolster the US preponderance while facilitating the reconstituting of a hierarchical order that includes China, Japan, and India. The East Asian hierarchy is notable for its enduring layered nature. Within this US-dominated order, Japan has traditionally held the second-highest rank because of its alliance and strategic affinity with the United States, but after 1972, China entered the top ranks of this hierarchy and increasingly laid claims to the second position. During the Cold War, a looser Soviet-led hierarchical system did exist alongside the US-led hierarchy, but this disintegrated after 1972 and disappeared after 1989. In the post-Cold War period, the main challenge appears to be how to contain the incipient competition for the primary position in this hierarchy between the United States and China, but also how to manage potential contests over hierarchical rank between Japan, India, and China. 3.1 Consolidating U.S. preponderance, 1945–1970 After the Second World War, the United States emerged as the world's greatest power: the size of its economy was three times that of Russia and more than five times that of Britain after the war; it held two-thirds of the world's gold reserves and three-quarters of its invested capital, and more than half the world's manufacturing capacity (Leffler, 1992). This status quo preponderance was, however, perceived to have been threatened by the USSR's ascension to superpower status, especially in terms of rising Soviet military influence in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia. While post-war American efforts to rally against Soviet geopolitical aspirations were concentrated in Europe and the Northern Tier, it was the Korean War that marked the beginning of the use of military force to counter communist expansion on a global scale.9 The American decision to cross the 38th parallel was an attempt to secure preponderant power in East Asia, and establish a global containment posture against Moscow. China's entry into the Korean War launched its own quest to become a great power, and was, in American eyes, a corollary to Soviet expansionist aims to establish international communist domination and push back the US power from key geostrategic strong points on the Eurasian continent. The Korean War decisively opened up Asia as an enduring theatre of the Cold War, in which future American policy calculations would have to take into account China as well as the Soviet Union. Because of its dominant power, the United States was able to throw a security cordon around China to contain Washington's growing fear of Asian revolution influenced by Chinese communists. This entailed primarily recognition and a commitment to the defense of the Republic of China on Taiwan, and an early end to the occupation of Japan, a peace and security treaty granting American forces’ extensive base rights in the post-Occupation period, and American sponsorship of Japanese re-development. Washington also signed security pacts with the Philippines, New Zealand, and Australia, and entered into defensive treaties with the Republic of Korea (1953) and Taiwan (1954). The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was also created (in late 1954) and was comprised of non-communist states within and outside the Asian region. Moreover, the United States placed restrictions on European and Japanese economic relations with China (Schaller, 1985). In these ways, the US strategy in the 1950s constituted the regional order at a time of post-war weakness of established East Asian states and decolonization of new states. The US resources, actions, and relationships helped establish a hierarchy with the United States firmly at the top. Its role in ending the Pacific war had already guaranteed it a vital role in post-war regional reconstruction, but by entering the Korean War, Washington further established security priorities in Northeast Asia, identified the other important major states in the region, and which it would make friends and enemies of in the unfolding global ideological contest. Thus, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were incorporated into the US-led hierarchy by virtue of their strategic importance, and were extended hierarchical assurance by means of US security guarantees and economic aid and access for reconstruction and development. In return, these states deferred to US preponderance and leadership by their strategic dependence and clientalism, and by gradually evolving into bastions of capitalist democracies. In contrast, the opening of the East Asian front of the Cold War in Korea created as challengers to US preponderance and hierarchy the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and later the Indo-Chinese states. This communist bloc was a competing regional hierarchy of sorts, but one that was less defined because of the lack of clarity about rank ordering within the region, and thus continually subject to internal conflict and external disruption.10 Yet, American dominance in East Asia was sustained in this period: even though there were many conflicts, the regional order was relatively stable because US commitment to sustaining its hierarchical preponderance was clear. This was seen especially in the offshore islands crises in the late 1950s, during which Chinese claims over islands near Taiwan met with little or no Soviet support, and the main incentive for Chinese restraint was the asymmetrical nuclear capability possessed by the United States (Chang, 1990). In the 1960s, the United States continued its policy of active containment in East Asia in the form of growing intervention in the Vietnam conflict, culminating in air strikes and a land invasion in 1965. The application of this grand strategy to preserve the US regional and global preponderance to Vietnam in the 1960s, however, revealed new constraints of American power in terms of the limits of US public tolerance for protracted and destructive warfare in a distant land against an ideological enemy. 3.2 Hierarchical uncertainty and regional instability, 1970–90 The unwinnable war in Vietnam led to a transition period in East Asia marked by grave uncertainty about the global balance of power between the United States and USSR, and about the stability of the regional hierarchy. In his 1969 Guam Doctrine, Richard Nixon declared a scaling-down of US global aspirations. The United States was now a Pacific power with reservations; it had no intention of becoming directly involved again in any regional conflict in Asia, although it would support allies and friends with military assistance and diplomatic backing. Washington's unsuccessful and draining war in Vietnam had already undermined regional confidence in its continued willingness to shoulder the costs of regional primacy, and the Guam Doctrine was interpreted by Asian states as signaling the potential abandonment of American regional leadership all together. This acute uncertainty about the US position at the top of the regional hierarchy led to instability and war, as regional states engaged in self-help and balance of power politics more actively than at any time since the end of the Second World War. The first significant change was that China became a much more prominent actor by being co-opted into the high levels of the US-led hierarchy. The bipolar superpower conflict underwent dramatic changes in the 1970s: the pre-existing Sino-Soviet strategic enmity intensified into a border war in 1969, and in response to the Nixon administration's overtures, China ‘defected’ from its alliance with the Soviet Union to a rapprochement and normalization with the US. The United States, meanwhile, sought a parallel détente with the Soviet Union. A strategic triangle thus emerged, with the United States as the pivotal player enjoying relatively good relations with the other two (Kissinger, 1977; Nixon, 1978). With the congruence between ideology and strategic affinity broken, the Cold War assumed an explicit realpolitik hue, focusing on state interests and capabilities. Within Asia though, the power competition developed along the Sino-Soviet fault-line, with the United States and China on the same side. The Sino-American rapprochement did not encourage Soviet conciliation, and instead heightened Soviet insecurity. Thus, one of the immediate Soviet reactions after the rapprochement was to encourage India to facilitate the breakup of Pakistan, a staunch ally of China. This forced the American ‘tilt toward Pakistan’ in 1971 in order to prevent India from destroying the Pakistani army and endangering China (Goh, 2004, pp.185–192). The Sino-Japanese rapprochement and Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978 further exacerbated the Soviet sense of isolation and encirclement. Moscow now saw itself as confronted in East Asia by an alliance of the most populous, most economically successful, and most powerful states, without the buffer of a friendly China to make up for the traditionally loose Soviet Far Eastern commitment (Solomon, 1982). This in turn contributed to more aggressive Soviet policy, such as the invasion of Afghanistan and the decision to support Vietnam (Yahuda, 1996). The Soviets granted Vietnam membership in COMECON and signed a formal friendship treaty with that Southeast Asian country in late 1978, which provided support for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. China, in turn, was emboldened by its normalized relationship with the United States to attack Vietnam to ‘teach it a lesson’ for the Cambodian infringement (Ross, 1993). Thus, by 1979, strategic enmities in East Asia followed the Sino-Soviet divide, which was reinforced by the breakdown of the Soviet-American détente. Without the direct intervention of the United States, this pattern of conflict remained localized, centered on Indochina and regional powers. Hanoi and Moscow had taken advantage of the declining US commitment to the region to push Vietnam's bid for hegemony in Indochina; and upon its cooption into the regional hierarchy, China had taken punitive military action against Vietnam to try to uphold the regional status quo. The destabilizing effects of uncertainty about continued US dominance in the regional hierarchy was further evinced in Southeast Asia by the formation of the ASEAN in 1967. This collection of small, non-communist states saw their existing policy of bandwagoning with the United States as unsustainable, and chose to band together in a diplomatic community to help ensure their autonomy and security (Leifer, 1989). The stalemate that materialized over the ensuing decade featured internationally isolated Vietnam depending upon the Soviet Union to sustain its dominant position in Cambodia while being confronted in the margins by resistance forces backed by China, the United States, and ASEAN countries. It is possible to argue that for the Asian region as a whole, the late 1970s and 1980s saw a relatively stable pro-Western power equilibrium: apart from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, almost all the other countries in the region, including China, were tied into a Western alliance system in one way or another (Zagoria, 1982). Yet, the United States receded as the central state in the regional order during this time. In South Asia, as a result of the 1971 war and Pakistani fragmentation, a strengthened India moved closer to the USSR by signing a bilateral Friendship Treaty. In East Asia, China (as a US partner) and Vietnam (with Soviet backing) became the key protagonists on the regional stage, while ASEAN also developed a greater role with its international diplomatic activism. During this unstable period, the regional hierarchy was in flux as the United States withdrew from its dominant position; China was gradually but uncertainly incorporated into the regional hierarchy and was the main protagonist in the conflict with communist Vietnam and the Soviet Union; while Indochina and ASEAN developed their own dynamics outside of the shifting regional great power hierarchy. 3.3 Reconstituting hierarchical order after 1990 The end of the Cold War brought about the most significant transition in the global and Asian regional orders. Globally, the United States remained the only superpower with resources that outstripped those of any other single state. In Asia, China's position continued to strengthen, as concerns grew about the further decline of American strategic interest in the region. The 1990s are notable as a decade in which regional actors become most prominent in actively trying to reconstitute the regional hierarchy, to maneuver the United States firmly back into a position of regional primacy. This activism on the part of both important potential challengers and strategically less powerful regional states is a strong indication of the mutually constructed, consensual nature of the preferred hierarchical order. The post-Cold War uncertainty about American commitment to Asia particularly affected Japan and Southeast Asia. Both reacted by trying to retain the dominant US military presence and its important economic and political influence in the region. The Japan–United States alliance could have been undermined after more than a decade of trade conflicts and bilateral tension over charges that it was free-riding on the US security guarantee, and by the deepening uncertainty surrounding the US commitment to East Asia in the early 1990s. Instead, the US policy-makers decided to strengthen their strategic ties as Tokyo likewise chose to enhance its alliance with Washington. Japan's decision reflected a fear of abandonment by the United States and a desire to continue to bind the US to the bilateral security guarantee and to its dominant position in the region. At the most pragmatic level, given the domestic political difficulties involved in constitutional amendment and in the face of security threats from North Korea and China, Japan needed to maintain its special relationship with the United States. The April 1996 Japan–United States Joint Declaration on Security and September 1997 Revised Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation allowed for the expansion of security cooperation, especially in supplies and services to ‘situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security’ (see guidelines available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html). This extended the Japanese Self-Defense Forces' mandate beyond defending the home islands against direct attack, to more generally enhancing regional stability. More recently, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Japanese Diet passed an emergency law in October 2001 that allowed the Japanese military to provide logistical support for United States and others in anti-terrorist missions, paving the way for Japan to provide support functions in campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.11 These were decisions calculated to buttress the Japanese alliance with the United States, to assure the continuity of the US commitment to national and regional security in spite of changing strategic circumstances (Katzenstein and Okawara, 2004). This intensification of the United States–Japan alliance critically helps to underwrite the United States' position as the dominant state in the regional hierarchy in two ways: it enhances U.S. power projection both in the region and in the world; and it is a powerful symbol of the acquiescence and subordination of the main potential challenger for regional hegemony to the US domination (Nau, 2003, pp. 224–230). Thus, Japan's continued hierarchical deference to the United States vitally underpins its super-ordinate position in the region. Owing to their peripheral location and relative lack of strategic importance to the United States, most Southeast Asian states were even more concerned about a potential American withdrawal after the Cold War in the face of a rising China. Much has been written about Southeast Asian policies of engagement with China to mediate the China threat (Ba, 2003; Shambaugh, 2004/5; Goh, 2007). At the same time, however, they have tried selectively to harness the superior US force in the region to deter the potential aggression from China. Two Southeast Asian states – the Philippines and Thailand – are formal allies of the United States, but neither plays host to American bases. Instead, they and a number of non-allied countries, including Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia – provide military facilities and access to the US naval and air forces. They also participate in bilateral and multilateral joint exercises with the US forces, and some countries have preferential military supply relations with the Americans (Goh, 2007/08, pp. 113–157). They further demonstrate hierarchical deference and support by additionally tying themselves more closely to the United States in the short- to medium-term fight against terrorism, to help anchor the United States in the region as a counterweight against China (Goh, 2005b; Khong, 2004). Rather than encouraging the United States to target its forces directly against China, though, the goal is to further buttress American military superiority in the region, or to demonstrate the ability to harness it in ways required to act as a general deterrence to Chinese (or other) aggression.12 At the same time, they also seek to strengthen their individual military capabilities by attracting the US military aid and training, trade, and economic assistance. Southeast Asian strategies go beyond simple bandwagoning with the dominant power, though, because they pay great attention also to engaging China and other regional powers. For instance, ASEAN's efforts at developing closer economic relations, generating more sustained political/security dialogue, and establishing military exchanges and relationships, are aimed not only at China, but also at the United States, as well as other major regional players such as Japan, South Korea, and India. By enmeshing the United States, China, and other large powers into regional institutions and norms, Southeast Asian states want to involve them actively in the region by means of good political relationships, deep and preferential economic exchanges, and some degree of defense dialogue and exchange. Southeast Asian policy-makers believe that this creates greater long-term stability in the region (Acharya, 2002). The aim is not to produce a multipolar balance of power in the conventional sense, because the major powers involved here are not all equally formidable. Rather, many Southeast Asian countries prefer to retain the United States as the preponderant superpower, with China as the regional great power, and India and Japan as second-tier regional powers (Goh, 2007/08). This strategic vision reflects a surprising degree of activism on the part of subordinate states not only in helping to sustain hierarchical leadership, but also to innovate so as to buttress regional order. The key innovation here is to try to facilitate the further integration of China into the regional hierarchy, to lend more direction and substance to this process which began in the 1970s. The most important element though is how to integrate China at a level below that of the United States, that is, as the second ranked but still subordinate power. For the last 50 years, the East Asian hierarchy was US-dominated, with the rank order of states within the hierarchy dependent chiefly on alliance or other defense relations with the United States, while communist challengers were excluded from the hierarchy altogether. Now, China has to be integrated on the basis of its economic, political, and military strength, and perhaps more importantly, its right to be a leading power, as perceived by states the region. This model of regional order coincides most closely with Kang's model, though with two significant differences: the United States, not China, is the primary state; and the hierarchical order is constituted by layers of major powers, rather than just the one. 4 Hierarchy and the East Asian security order Currently, the regional hierarchy in East Asia is still dominated by the United States. Since the 1970s, China has increasingly claimed the position of second-ranked great power, a claim that is today legitimized by the hierarchical deference shown by smaller subordinate powers such as South Korea and Southeast Asia. Japan and South Korea can, by virtue of their alliance with the United States, be seen to occupy positions in a third layer of regional major powers, while India is ranked next on the strength of its new strategic relationship with Washington. North Korea sits outside the hierarchic order but affects it due to its military prowess and nuclear weapons capability. Apart from making greater sense of recent history, conceiving of the US' role in East Asia as the dominant state in the regional hierarchy helps to clarify three critical puzzles in the contemporary international and East Asian security landscape. First, it contributes to explaining the lack of sustained challenges to American global preponderance after the end of the Cold War. Three of the key potential global challengers to US unipolarity originate in Asia (China, India, and Japan), and their support for or acquiescence to, US dominance have helped to stabilize its global leadership. Through its dominance of the Asian regional hierarchy, the United States has been able to neutralize the potential threats to its position from Japan via an alliance, from India by gradually identifying and pursuing mutual commercial and strategic interests, and from China by encircling and deterring it with allied and friendly states that support American preponderance. Secondly, recognizing US hierarchical preponderance further explains contemporary under-balancing in Asia, both against a rising China, and against incumbent American power. I have argued that one defining characteristic of a hierarchical system is voluntary subordination of lesser states to the dominant state, and that this goes beyond rationalistic bandwagoning because it is manifested in a social contract that comprises the related processes of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference. Critically, successful and sustainable hierarchical assurance and deference helps to explain why Japan is not yet a ‘normal’ country. Japan has experienced significant impetus to revise and expand the remit of its security forces in the last 15 years. Yet, these pressures continue to be insufficient to prompt a wholesale revision of its constitution and its remilitarization. The reason is that the United States extends its security umbrella over Japan through their alliance, which has led Tokyo not only to perceive no threat from US dominance, but has in fact helped to forge a security community between them (Nau, 2003). Adjustments in burden sharing in this alliance since the 1990s have arisen not from greater independent Japanese strategic activism, but rather from periods of strategic uncertainty and crises for Japan when it appeared that American hierarchical assurance, along with US' position at the top of the regional hierarchy, was in question. Thus, the Japanese priority in taking on more responsibility for regional security has been to improve its ability to facilitate the US' central position, rather than to challenge it.13 In the face of the security threats from North Korea and China, Tokyo's continued reliance on the security pact with the United States is rational. While there remains debate about Japan's re-militarization and the growing clout of nationalist ‘hawks’ in Tokyo, for regional and domestic political reasons, a sustained ‘normalization’ process cannot take place outside of the restraining framework of the United States–Japan alliance (Samuels, 2007; Pyle, 2007). Abandoning the alliance will entail Japan making a conscience choice not only to remove itself from the US-led hierarchy, but also to challenge the United States dominance directly. The United States–ROK alliance may be understood in a similar way, although South Korea faces different sets of constraints because of its strategic priorities related to North Korea. As J.J. Suh argues, in spite of diminishing North Korean capabilities, which render the US security umbrella less critical, the alliance endures because of mutual identification – in South Korea, the image of the US as ‘the only conceivable protector against aggression from the North,’ and in the United States, an image of itself as protector of an allied nation now vulnerable to an ‘evil’ state suspected of transferring weapons of mass destruction to terrorist networks (Suh, 2004). Kang, in contrast, emphasizes how South Korea has become less enthusiastic about its ties with the United States – as indicated by domestic protests and the rejection of TMD – and points out that Seoul is not arming against a potential land invasion from China but rather maritime threats (Kang, 2003, pp.79–80). These observations are valid, but they can be explained by hierarchical deference toward the United States, rather than China. The ROK's military orientation reflects its identification with and dependence on the United States and its adoption of US' strategic aims. In spite of its primary concern with the North Korean threat, Seoul's formal strategic orientation is toward maritime threats, in line with Washington's regional strategy. Furthermore, recent South Korean Defense White Papers habitually cited a remilitarized Japan as a key threat. The best means of coping with such a threat would be continued reliance on the US security umbrella and on Washington's ability to restrain Japanese remilitarization (Eberstadt et al., 2007). Thus, while the United States–ROK bilateral relationship is not always easy, its durability is based on South Korea's fundamental acceptance of the United States as the region's primary state and reliance on it to defend and keep regional order. It also does not rule out Seoul and other US allies conducting business and engaging diplomatically with China. India has increasingly adopted a similar strategy vis-à-vis China in recent years. Given its history of territorial and political disputes with China and its contemporary economic resurgence, India is seen as the key potential power balancer to a growing China. Yet, India has sought to negotiate settlements about border disputes with China, and has moved significantly toward developing closer strategic relations with the United States. Apart from invigorated defense cooperation in the form of military exchange programs and joint exercises, the key breakthrough was the agreement signed in July 2005 which facilitates renewed bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation (Mohan, 2007). Once again, this is a key regional power that could have balanced more directly and independently against China, but has rather chosen to align itself or bandwagon with the primary power, the United States, partly because of significant bilateral gains, but fundamentally in order to support the latter's regional order-managing function. Recognizing a regional hierarchy and seeing that the lower layers of this hierarchy have become more active since the mid-1970s also allows us to understand why there has been no outright balancing of China by regional states since the 1990s. On the one hand, the US position at the top of the hierarchy has been revived since the mid-1990s, meaning that deterrence against potential Chinese aggression is reliable and in place.14 On the other hand, the aim of regional states is to try to consolidate China's inclusion in the regional hierarchy at the level below that of the United States, not to keep it down or to exclude it. East Asian states recognize that they cannot, without great cost to themselves, contain Chinese growth. But they hope to socialize China by enmeshing it in peaceful regional norms and economic and security institutions. They also know that they can also help to ensure that the capabilities gap between China and the United States remains wide enough to deter a power transition. Because this strategy requires persuading China about the appropriateness of its position in the hierarchy and of the legitimacy of the US position, all East Asian states engage significantly with China, with the small Southeast Asian states refusing openly to ‘choose sides’ between the United States and China. Yet, hierarchical deference continues to explain why regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN + 3, and East Asian Summit have made limited progress. While the United State has made room for regional multilateral institutions after the end of the Cold War, its hierarchical preponderance also constitutes the regional order to the extent that it cannot comfortably be excluded from any substantive strategic developments. On the part of some lesser states (particularly Japan and Singapore), hierarchical deference is manifested in inclusionary impulses (or at least impulses not to exclude the United States or US proxies) in regional institutions, such as the East Asia Summit in December 2005. Disagreement on this issue with others, including China and Malaysia, has stymied potential progress in these regional institutions (Malik, 2006). Finally, conceiving of a US-led East Asian hierarchy amplifies our understanding of how and why the United States–China relationship is now the key to regional order. The vital nature of the Sino-American relationship stems from these two states' structural positions. As discussed earlier, China is the primary second-tier power in the regional hierarchy. However, as Chinese power grows and Chinese activism spreads beyond Asia, the United States is less and less able to see China as merely a regional power – witness the growing concerns about Chinese investment and aid in certain African countries. This causes a disjuncture between US global interests and US regional interests. Regional attempts to engage and socialize China are aimed at mediating its intentions. This process, however, cannot stem Chinese growth, which forms the material basis of US threat perceptions. Apprehensions about the growth of China's power culminates in US fears about the region being ‘lost’ to China, echoing Cold War concerns that transcribed regional defeats into systemic setbacks.15 On the other hand, the US security strategy post-Cold War and post-9/11 have regional manifestations that disadvantage China. The strengthening of US alliances with Japan and Australia; and the deployment of US troops to Central, South, and Southeast Asia all cause China to fear a consolidation of US global hegemony that will first threaten Chinese national security in the regional context and then stymie China's global reach. Thus, the key determinants of the East Asian security order relate to two core questions: (i) Can the US be persuaded that China can act as a reliable ‘regional stakeholder’ that will help to buttress regional stability and US global security aims;16 and (ii) can China be convinced that the United States has neither territorial ambitions in Asia nor the desire to encircle China, but will help to promote Chinese development and stability as part of its global security strategy? (Wang, 2005). But, these questions cannot be asked in the abstract, outside the context of negotiation about their relative positions in the regional and global hierarchies. One urgent question for further investigation is how the process of assurance and deference operate at the topmost levels of a hierarchy? When we have two great powers of unequal strength but contesting claims and a closing capabilities gap in the same regional hierarchy, how much scope for negotiation is there, before a reversion to balancing dynamics? This is the main structural dilemma: as long as the United States does not give up its primary position in the Asian regional hierarchy, China is very unlikely to act in a way that will provide comforting answers to the two questions. Yet, the East Asian regional order has been and still is constituted by US hegemony, and to change that could be **extremely disruptive** and may lead to regional actors acting in **highly destabilizing ways**. Rapid Japanese remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan Straits, Indian nuclear brinksmanship directed toward Pakistan, or a highly destabilized Korean peninsula are all illustrative of potential regional disruptions. 5 Conclusion To construct a coherent account of East Asia's evolving security order, I have suggested that the United States is the **central force** in constituting regional stability and order. The major patterns of equilibrium and turbulence in the region since 1945 can be explained by the relative stability of the US position at the top of the regional hierarchy, with periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with greatest uncertainty over the American commitment to managing regional order. Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference explain the unusual character of regional order in the post-Cold War era. However, the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict between China and the United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy, a contest made more potent because of the inter-twining of regional and global security concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality requires conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership position, while being persuaded to buy into shared strategic interests and constrain its own in ways that its vision of regional and global security may eventually be reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can Washington be persuaded that its central position in the hierarchy must be ultimately shared in ways yet to be determined? The future of the East Asian security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the United States' global leadership and regional domination. At the regional level, the main scenarios of disruption are an outright Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent history suggests, and the preceding analysis has shown, that challenges to or defections from US leadership will come at junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the region is in doubt, which in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of change. This is the one factor that could lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional challenges or defections. However, it is notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds of over-extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus over the United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that could surface as a result of not doing so would appear to be much worse.

### 4

Executive Counterplan

#### The President of the United States should declare that the US will not introduce nuclear weapons first into hostilities.

#### Congress fails—leads to miscalc and wartime mistakes

Edwin M. Smith 1987; Edwin M. Smith, the Leon Benwell Professor of Law and International Relations at USC, “Congressional Authorization of Nuclear First Use: Problems of Implementation” First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Under the Constitution, Who Decides? P 169

Even if information gathering were an uncomplicated process, analysis of the data would be no simple matter. Analysis of collected information allows the production of “net intelligence assessments” of the goals, capabilities, and strategies of other nations in order to construct interaction proﬁles suggesting the manner in which that nation may respond in particular contexts.5 Analysts in different agencies, encountering extreme difficulty in distinguishing the “sig- nal” of important intelligence from the “noise” of mountains of routinely col- lected information, may dismiss important facts.“ Bureaucratic boundaries may cause analysts to miss important patterns in data existing in different organiza- tions. Parochial conflicts over particular intelligence-gathering programs and methods may frustrate the coordinated collection of essential data.7 Analysts in successive levels of bureaucracy may fail to communicate important ambiguities in that information, causing “uncertainty absorption” which may lead decision makers to place more reliance on the information than is warranteds The wartime expansion of raw data necessary to be analyzed can only exac- erbate the problems of effective assessment. While the peacetime assessment process is highly centralized, the wartime performance of much of the assessment function will devolve to those tactical combat units immediately concerned, since higher commands will only be able to assess that intelligence essential to the function of controlling larger units. The vast amounts of intelligence gathered at the tactical level may not even be transmitted to high-level headquarters. Such a devolution is consistent with historical pattems of hierarchically organized c/onventional military forces Evaluation of information regarding an opponent's intentions involves addi- tional inherent difficulties. Assessments of enemy intentions may prove to be unreliable because adversaries may have multiple goals or goals which evolve with the situation.” The uncertainty regarding an opponent's intentions may even reﬂect that opponent’s real ambivalence." '

### Threats

#### Accidental launches won’t happen and wouldn’t escalate

Quinlan 9 [Michael Quinlan, former British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Defence, former Director of the Ditchley Foundation, Visiting Professor at King's College London, “Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects,” Oxford University Press, p. 69]

It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of its initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63–4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.

#### No accidental detonation

Quinlan 9 [Michael Quinlan, former British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Defence, former Director of the Ditchley Foundation, Visiting Professor at King's College London, “Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects,” Oxford University Press, p. 67-8]

There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements—it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense.

#### Deploying conventional tridents would cause global missile prolif, resulting in global ambiguity that causes nuclear war

**Mistry, Cincinnati political science professor, 2010**

(Dinshaw, “Going Nowhere Fast Assessing Concerns about Long-Range Conventional Ballistic Missiles”, International Security, Spring, project muse, ldg)

U.S. deployments of long-range conventional ballistic missiles would considerably undermine the global regime to restrain the spread of ballistic missiles. Prevailing discourse about the conventional Trident has downplayed this missile proliferation issue. Some studies, including Sugden's, do not address it at all.4 Others discuss the issue only briefly. For example, a National Academy of Sciences report dismissed the proliferation implications of long-range conventional missiles in just a few sentences: "In general, countries will do what is in their own national interest and within their technological capability and financial capacity, regardless of what the United States does—or does not do—about CPGS [conventional PGS]. … Nor is CPGS likely to have a substantial effect on efforts to impede the spread of ballistic missile or nuclear technology."5 Such assertions do not fully consider the negative missile proliferation implications of conventional Trident deployments. For more than two decades, the United States has led international efforts against ballistic missile proliferation. Washington was instrumental in establishing and expanding the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which prohibits the transfer of missiles and missile technologies. Since the 1980s, a large number of missile technology suppliers have accepted the MTCR's norms and practices. A combination of MTCR embargoes, U.S. diplomacy, regional political and security considerations, and domestic factors restricted the missile programs of nine states (Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, South Africa, South Korea, Syria, and Taiwan).6 Some of these states gave up their missile programs entirely, and others were limited to building short-range missiles. The MTCR has been augmented by the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, signed by more than 100 states. [End Page 173] Thus, under an evolving missile nonproliferation regime, ballistic missiles have been internationally stigmatized, largely because they are a key nuclear delivery system and their proliferation undermines the nuclear nonproliferation regime.7 An international norm proscribes missiles with ranges of more than 300 kilometers (these thresholds are noted in the MTCR).8 Only six states currently build and deploy medium-range or intermediate-range missiles (these terms are often used interchangeably for missiles with ranges of 1,000 to 5,000 kilometers). Of these states, four (China, India, Israel, and Pakistan) maintain their medium-range missiles primarily for delivering nuclear rather than conventional weapons. A fifth, North Korea, was prepared to give up its mediumrange missiles under an agreement with President Bill Clinton's administration that ultimately was not completed.9 Finally, the five states that do possess long-range missiles have reinforced norms against conventionalizing them. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States maintain their long-range missiles solely for nuclear deterrence purposes; they have not conventionally armed these missiles and have never used them in combat. In addition, Russia and the United States destroyed their medium-range missiles under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, and France and the United Kingdom do not have such missiles. In this context, if the United States legitimizes the use of ballistic missiles (especially those with ranges beyond MTCR thresholds) for conventional missions, after they have been stigmatized for more than two decades as a weapon of concern, other states would be more likely to develop their own "conventional" ballistic missiles.10 Many of the states that restricted themselves to short-range missiles, but have the technological capability to build missiles with greater ranges, could assert that they are following the U.S. example and develop such missiles. Moreover, once the ballistic missile becomes more widely used as a conventional weapon, the seriousness of the missile proliferation issue would diminish; the norm against the spread of ballistic missiles would erode; and regimes that control the spread of missiles would weaken. This situation is hardly desirable; a world with a strong missile nonproliferation regime and few states possessing missiles is, simply put, far better for U.S., regional, and international security than one with a weak missile nonproliferation regime and the extensive proliferation of ballistic missiles. For this reason, policymakers and analysts have called for further strengthening the missile nonproliferation regime through global treaties against entire classes of missiles.11 [End Page 174] An early argument that addressed missile proliferation concerns was that the United States would restrict itself to just twenty-four conventional Tridents, and this limited number of missiles supposedly would not undermine existing practices against the widespread use of medium-range and long-range conventional ballistic missiles.12 Yet these early arguments have been overtaken by technological and military impulses to develop a series of conventional missiles superior to the conventional Trident. Analysts and defense planners are conceptualizing at least five types of long-range conventional ballistic missiles for missions far beyond the limited niche missions initially proposed for the conventional Trident.13 In short, once the United States deploys the conventional Trident and breaks the norm against conventionalizing long-range missiles, it is likely to develop several other such missiles. These U.S. CBM deployments would undermine norms against missiles and the global missile nonproliferation regime. Regional Nuclear Ambiguity and the Nuclear Taboo Another major concern with conventionalizing long-range missiles, which has not been examined in studies of the issue, involves the problem of regional nuclear ambiguity. If the United States conventionalizes its long-range missiles, existing nuclear-armed powers would be more likely to arm their medium-range and long-range missiles with conventional warheads, raising serious concerns about crisis stability. Despite having far different nuclear capabilities and doctrines compared with those of the United States, other nuclear powers have at times closely copied its nuclear policies when it is technically feasible, and it is certainly feasible for them to conventionalize their nuclear missiles.14 In this context, the nuclear ambiguity issue in regional nuclear dyads (such as the China-India; Pakistan-India; Pakistan-Israel; and, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Iran-Israel dyads) would be serious. Moreover, ambiguity mitigation and transparency measures being proposed for the U.S.-Russia dyad would be harder to implement in more volatile regional situations. In a political-military crisis, a regional power could misinterpret a conventional ballistic missile fired from its regional nuclear rival as an indicator of a nuclear attack and could respond with nuclear weapons. Breaking the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons would be detrimental not only to the parties involved but also to U.S. and international security.15

### Prolif

Squo is goldilocks—significant nuclear reforms either prove the squo solves or disproves their solvency thesis—a full NFU triggers assurance collapse

Mort Halperin, senior advisor to the Open Society Foundations, May 2010, A New Nuclear Posture, Arms Control Today, Proquest

The administration took two other important steps in moving declaratory policy away from the calculated ambiguity that was at odds with the U.S. interest in the nonuse of nuclear weapons. First, the administration finally issued a "clean" negative security assurance, asserting that "[t]he United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations."4 Non-nuclear-weapon states that faithfully adhere to the NPT were surely entitled to such a pledge from the start. How can the United States ask other states to sign a treaty that prohibits them from possessing nuclear weapons, while also exposing them to nuclear weapons threats by those who are permitted them? Some press reports have interpreted this as a new threat against Iran and North Korea. It is not a new threat in any sense. Every previous administration has made this "threat" against every adherent to the NPT. What Iran and North Korea have been given is a clear choice: come into compliance with the NPT in exchange for immunity from nuclear attack or remain outside and at risk. The NPR goes one important step further by delimiting the circumstances in which the United States would consider using nuclear weapons against states that either have nuclear weapons or are working toward them. It says that the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons "in extreme circumstances" to defend "vital interests."5 The United States no longer intends to use nuclear weapons whenever it is convenient, but only reserves the right to decide to do so in extraordinary circumstances. In addition to issues relating to declaratory policy, the debate within the administration focused on how to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal while meeting Obama's objectives of reducing the number of nuclear weapons and their role in U.S. policy so as to advance the country's nonproliferation objectives. Although the NPR, to the disappointment of many, commits to substantial expenditures on the nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure, in terms of doctrine and policy it sets out a policy fully consistent with Obama's goals. The NPR announced three very firm nos. First, it says flatly and without qualification that "[t]he United States will not conduct nuclear testing."6 It goes on to call for Senate consent to ratification as well as entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which means persuading many other recalcitrant countries to adhere to the treaty. The second no is that the United States will not "develop new nuclear warheads."7 Again, there is no equivocation, and the NPR says that the program to maintain a safe and effective nuclear arsenal will use only previously tested designs. The NPR also expresses a strong preference for refurbishment or reuse of an existing configuration: "Replacement of nuclear components would be undertaken only if.. .goals [of the program] could not be met, and if specifically authorized by the President and approved by Congress."8 Such replacement would have to be with a plutonium pit that had been tested for another purpose. The third no is that the program will not be aimed at developing new military missions or provide for new military capabilities. The NPR promises that this approach will permit substantial reductions in the U.S. stockpile of nondeployed weapons. These weapons are now maintained as a hedge against technical failures or a change in the international situation that required a larger deployed force. A more robust research effort would provide a substitute hedge for both of these purposes. The NPR does not provide any specific numbers for either the existing nondeployed stockpile or for the number or timing of the proposed reductions. The administration made a decision at the outset to write only one version of the NPR and to release it in its entirety. There was apparently an intense debate at the last moment about whether these numbers could be declassified and included in the report. The review of this question continues, and one can only hope that Obama's commitment to transparency, which strongly influenced this entire effort, will prevail here as well. A robust commitment to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective arsenal within these very clear policy guidelines does not interfere in any way with U.S. nonproliferation efforts or a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. It is also, practically speaking, a necessary precondition for Senate consent to ratification of the CTBT. The administration now appears confident that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will be ratified, perhaps even this year, and with an overwhelming vote. Because New START is a modest step, following in every important detail the recommendations of the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger Commission,9 on which the author served, the Senate should overwhelmingly support the treaty. There will certainly not be the same level of Senate support for the CTBT, which split the commission. Securing a bipartisan supermajority in the Senate for ratification will require, along with other steps, persuading key senators that the administration is serious about the modernization of the nuclear complex and that Congress as a whole is prepared to provide the funding. The decisions on declaratory policy and stockpile management now appear to enjoy the firm support of the departments of Defense, Energy, and State, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the nuclear weapons complex. The administration also consulted actively with key allies in the process. In doing so, it seems to have come to understand that Germany and Japan, often cited as the countries most concerned about extended deterrence, were comfortable with the changes announced by the NPR and would have supported more far-reaching changes. These discussions led to the decision to retire the TLAM-N nuclear cruise missile and to leave open for NATO discussions the role of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons forwarddeployed in Europe. These consultations also revealed that the South Koreans, as well as newer NATO members such as Poland, continue to have lingering concerns about more dramatic changes, such as a no-first-use policy. The key to maintaining momentum for the Prague agenda will be to reinvigorate NATO's conventional planning while educating key participants in all of these nations, in both official and track two conversations, about the limited role that nuclear weapons can and should play in their defense.

NFU doesn’t revive nonproliferation

Bruno Tertrais, FRS Senior Researcher, Former RAND Fellow, October 2009, The Case for No First Use: An Exchange, Survival 51.5

At first glance, it sounds like a great and simple idea. Any nuclear-weapon use would be a catastrophe: it would break the ‘nuclear taboo’ and have, in many scenarios, terrible material, human and even environmental consequences. But if all nuclear-capable countries committed themselves to a ‘no-first-use’ posture, then the risk of such an event would be drastically reduced. Scott Sagan's plea in favour of no first use is very well argued, and his article reopens an important and timely debate. However, I believe that the potential costs of no first use exceed its potential benefits. My conclusions are thus exactly the opposite of those reached by Sagan. My first argument is that the benefits of no-first-use postures are overrated. Can one believe that Tehran or Pyongyang would feel reassured by Western no-first-use statements? During the Cold War, we did not take Soviet no-first-use statements seriously. I doubt that governments that see the United States and its allies as adversaries would believe our own. And does the nuclear-proliferation risk today stem mostly from Western nuclear policies? There are good reasons to think that conventional superiority matters more. More importantly for the purpose of non-proliferation, why would Non-Aligned Movement countries consider that nuclear-weapon states would feel bound by no-first-use commitments if and when push came to shove? Some would, but others would not, and given the amount of misperception and sometimes paranoia regarding Western military policies in general, they would be many. The non-proliferation value of a no-first-use commitment would be limited. Sagan argues that first-use options encourage other countries to follow suit, citing the example of India. But nuclear doctrines are hardly a matter of fashion. They are driven by security interests and technical capabilities, political imperative and moral choices. More often than not, the same causes produce the same effects. Other countries' doctrines are used essentially as legitimising factors. New Delhi abandoned its no-first-use policy in 2003 for fear that Pakistan or China could use chemical or biological weapons in the course of a conflict against India despite their ratification of the relevant conventions.

#### Proliferation is slow, doesn’t cascade, and doesn’t cause conflict – 60 years of empirics prove

DeGarmo 2011

 Denise, professor of international relations at Southern Illinois University, “Proliferation Leads to Peace”

Unfortunately, while **the fear of proliferation is pervasive, it is unfounded and lacks an understanding of the evidence. Nuclear proliferation has been slow**. From [1945 to 1970](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_with_nuclear_weapons), only six countries acquired nuclear weapons: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, and Israel. **Since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into effect in 1970, only three countries have joined the nuclear club: India, Pakistan, and North Korea. In total, only .05% of the world’s states have nuclear weapons in their possession.** Supporters of non-proliferation seem to overlook the fact that there are states currently capable of making nuclear weapons and have chosen not to construct them, which illustrates the seriousness with which states consider their entrance into the nuclear club. Included on this list are such actors as: [Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa](http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/svr_nuke.htm). The attraction of nuclear weapons is multifold. Nuclear weapons enhance the international status of states that possess them and help insecure states feel more secure. States also seek nuclear capabilities for offensive purposes. It is important to point out that **while nuclear weapons have spread very slowly, conventional weapons have proliferated exponentially across the globe. The wars of the 21st century are being fought in the peripheral regions of the globe that are undergoing conventional weapons proliferation**. What the pundits of non-proliferation forget to mention are the many lessons that are learned from the nuclear world. Nuclear weapons provide stability just as they did during the Cold War era. The fear of [Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)](http://atomicarchive.com/History/coldwar/page15.shtml) loomed heavily on the minds of nuclear powers through out the Cold War and continues to be an important consideration for nuclear states today. States do not strike first unless they are assured of a military victory, and the probability of a military victory is diminished by fear that their actions would prompt a swift retaliation by other states. In other words, states with nuclear weapons are deterred by another state’s second-strike capabilities. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union could not destroy enough of the other’s massive arsenal of nuclear weapons to make a retaliatory strike bearable. Even the prospect of a small number of nuclear weapons being placed in Cuba by the Soviets had a great deterrent effect on the United States. Nothing can be done with nuclear weapons other than to use them for deterrent purposes. **If deterrence works reliably, as it has done over the past 60 plus years, then there is less to be feared from nuclear proliferation than there is from convention warfare**.

No miscalc impact

Preston 7

 Thomas, Professor of IR at Washington State, Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons”,

http://www.intellectualtakeout.org/library/books/lambs-lions-future-security-relationships-world-biological-and-nuclear-weapons

1.) The Cost of Deterrence Failure Is Too Great Advocates of deterrence seldom take the position that it will always work or that it cannot fail. Rather, they take the position that if one can achieve the requisite elements required to achieve a stable deterrent relationship between parties, it vastly decreases the chances of miscalculation and resorting to war—even in contexts where it might otherwise be expected to occur (George and Smoke 1974; Harvey 1997a; Powell 1990, 2003; Goldstein 2000). Unfortunately, critics of deterrence take the understandable, if unrealistic, position that if deterrence cannot be 100 percent effective under all circumstances, then it is an unsound strategic approach for states to rely upon, especially considering the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Feaver (1993, 162), for example, criticizes reliance on nuclear deterrence because it can fail and that rational deterrence theory can only predict that peace should occur most of the time (e.g., Lebow and Stein 1989). Yet, were we to apply this standard of perfection to most other policy approaches concerning security matters — whether it be arms control or proliferation regime efforts, military procurement policies, alliance formation strategies, diplomacy, or sanctions —none could be argued with any more certainty to completely remove the threat of equally devastating wars either. Indeed, one could easily make the argument that these alternative means have shown themselves historically to be far less effective than nuclear arms in preventing wars. Certainly, the twentieth century was replete with examples of devastating conventional conflicts which were not deterred through nonnuclear measures. Although the potential costs of a nuclear exchange between small states would indeed cause a frightful loss of life, it would be no more costly (and likely far less so) than large-scale conventional conflicts have been for combatants. Moreover, if nuclear deterrence raises the potential costs of war high enough for policy makers to want to avoid (rather than risk) conflict, it is just as legitimate (if not more so) for optimists to argue in favor of nuclear deterrence in terms of the lives saved through the avoidance of far more likely recourses to conventional wars, as it is for pessimists to warn of the potential costs of deterrence failure. And, while some accounts describing the "immense weaknesses" of deterrence theory (Lebow and Stein 1989, 1990) would lead one to believe deterrence was almost impossible to either obtain or maintain, since 1945 there has not been one single historical instance of nuclear deterrence failure (especially when this notion is limited to threats to key central state interests like survival, and not to minor probing of peripheral interests). Moreover, the actual costs of twentieth-century conventional conflicts have been staggeringly immense, especially when compared to the actual costs of nuclear conflicts (for example, 210,000 fatalities in the combined 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings compared to 62 million killed overall during World War II, over three million dead in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, etc.) (McKinzie et al. 2001, 28).3 Further, as Gray (1999, 158-59) observes, "it is improbable that policymakers anywhere need to be educated as to the extraordinary qualities and quantities of nuclear armaments." Indeed, the high costs and uncontestable, immense levels of destruction that would be caused by nuclear weapons have been shown historically to be facts that have not only been readily apparent and salient to a wide range of policy makers, but ones that have clearly been demonstrated to moderate extreme policy or risk-taking behavior (Blight 1992; Preston 2001) Could it go wrong? Of course. There is always that potential with human beings in the loop. Nevertheless, it has also been shown to be effective at moderating policy maker behavior and introducing an element of constraint into situations that otherwise would likely have resulted in war (Hagerty 1998).

No compliance

Edwin Smith, Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center, 1987, First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Under the Constitution, Who Decides?, p. 169-70

The Constitution apart, practical implementation problems raise serious doubt as to the ability of the congressional nuclear planning committee proposed by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) to assert effective authority over the use of nuclear weapons after the initiation of actual hostilities in Western Europe. First, any congressional committee entrusted with a veto over first use will confront enormous difficulties in acquiring independent and objective information upon which to base its veto decision. Part I of this paper shows that without the President ’ s cooperation, the committee would be unable to acquire sufficient timely information to avoid either a rubber stamp approval of the President ’ s first use decision or a veto devoid of substantial evidentiary support. Second, should the planning committee determine to exercise its veto after the President had concluded that first use was necessary, he may well ignore that veto. Part II shows that application of cognitive and motivational psychology and of the dynamics of small decision making groups to historical instances of executive crisis decision making leaves doubt that the President would comply with a congressional veto. These practical problems, however, could be ameliorated by a change in the form of congressional participation. Part III of the paper describes two possible changes. I. THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION Three basic information related obstacles stand in the path of the effective exercise of the committee ’ s veto power. First, a wartime military establishment will acquire intelligence that will differ both qualitatively and quantitatively from that acquired in peacetime. Even if the committee is continuously briefed during ­ Page 170 peacetime in preparation for its role, the changes in intelligence acquisition occasioned by the wartime context may render such preparation useless. Second, the intelligence analysis which would form the basis of a presidential first use decision would involve inherent ambiguities. These ambiguities would make it impossible for the nuclear planning committee to challenge a presidential authorization based on information which, while ambiguous, may indicate enemy preparation to engage in a nuclear first strike. Finally, the nuclear planning committee, in any attempt to exercise a veto, must rely on the information provided to it by the executive branch advocates of first use. Unless the executive is completely cooperative, the committee may have great difficulty developing a factual foundation for any conclusion other than the rubber stamp approval of presidential first use.

### China

Modernization means nothing

Zhou 11 – associate professor at Hobart and William Smith Colleges in New York [Jinghao, “US-China rivalry still a mismatch”, April 14, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MD14Ad01.html]

Policy of defense Ever since the Great Wall was built more than 2,000 years ago, China's military policy has largely revolved around defense. So much so that Western powers had to use gun ships to knock out the doors of the Middle Kingdom in the mid-19th century. Yet Washington is concerned about the development of China's military. The 2010 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission pointed out that China has accelerated military modernization, including foreign purchases and indigenous production of high-technology equipment. No doubt, China's military budget has rapidly grown. In 2010, the defense budget was 532.115 billion yuan (US$81.3 billion), while this year it is expected to hit 601 billion yuan. Western governments are wondering why China has accelerated its military modernization since it faces no obvious threat. After visiting China in 2010, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates concluded that China's military development will challenge US military power in Asia and may challenge the US military operation worldwide. That China has sped up its military modernization is a fact. But this does not prove China has any intention of challenging US dominance. This kind of thinking displays a Cold War mentality, as if simply owning a strong military is a threat, then the US is the biggest threat to every country in the world. China spends one-eighth of the US's military budget, if one accepts the official figures. The US has the largest defense budget in the world, accounting for 47% of the world's total military spending. There are about 154 countries with a US military presence and 63 countries with US military bases and troops. By contrast, China does not have a single military base in any foreign country. Even now, the Chinese military lags far behind the US and European countries. Although China has nuclear-weapons capability, the Chinese army is ill-equipped. China does not have a large navy or a single aircraft carrier. China's air force does not have any long-range bombers. Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie told Gates that China is not an advanced military country and poses no threat to the rest of the world. This said, China needs to increase transparency of its military expansion, to let the world including the US know its military strategic intent, so as to assure the world that its rise is really "peaceful". China's military expansion will inevitably upset the existing balance of global forces with US in dominance. It is common sense that a nation's strength must be supported by military power. China needs a stronger military to protect its growing global interests. Dispatching naval warships to escort Chinese commercial ships off Somalia and help evacuate Chinese nationals in Libya is a good example. China could not have taken such actions 20 or 30 years ago when its military was rather weak. Another major reason for China to modernize its military force is to protect its territorial integrity, especially to prevent Taiwan from actually separating from China. If Washington sees this as a potential threat to US, then it has to gain a better understanding of Chinese people's feelings. The majority of the Chinese people clearly remember that China was bullied and humiliated by Western powers for a century.\

Relations solve nothing – No coop

**Blumenthal 11** (Dan, Resident fellow at AEI, Current commissioner and former vice chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, where he directs efforts to monitor, investigate, and provide recommendations on the national security implications of the economic relationship between the two countries. Previously, he was senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Secretary of Defense's Office of International Security Affairs and practiced law in New York prior to his government service. At AEI, in addition to his work on the national security implications of U.S.-Sino relations, he coordinates the Tocqueville on China project, which examines the underlying civic culture of post-Mao China. Mr. Blumenthal also contributes to AEI's Asian Outlook series and is a research associate with the National Asia Research Program. 10/3/2011, “The top ten unicorns of China policy”, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/the-top-ten-unicorns-of-china-policy/)

9) We need China's help to solve global problems. This is further down on my list because it is not really a fantastical unicorn. It is true. What is a fantasy is that China will be helpful. We do need China to disarm North Korea. They do not want to, and North Korea is now a nuclear power. The same may soon be true with Iran. The best we can get in our diplomacy with China is to stop Beijing from being less helpful. It is a fact that the global problems would be easier to manage with Chinese help. However, China actually contributing to global order is a unicorn.

#### Nuclear relations are independently complex---tension over first-use doesn’t undermine overall agreement on nuclear issues

Craig 7 – Susan Craig, China Specialist for PACOM J1, formerly intelligence analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office for the U.S. Army, July 2007, “Defining the U.S.-China Relationship: Beyond the Cold War and Status Quo Rise Constructs,” Issues & Insights, Vol. 7, No. 8

If the Americans and Chinese could abandon the overly simplistic constructs of the status quo rise and the Cold War, perhaps our conversations could be more productive. Beyond these characterizations, there is much upon which the two countries agree. By exploring where our interests converge, perhaps we can find a more useful construct for our relationship.

The long-term peace and stability of East Asia is in both countries’ interest as is the nonproliferation of nuclear technologies and weapons. Both countries are concerned about affordable, accessible, and abundant energy supplies and the security of sea lanes of communication. Nontraditional transnational issues, such as infectious diseases, drug trafficking, terrorism, and pollution threaten both countries. Deterring a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan is also a shared goal.

Evident from the Strategic Dialogue, there is also much the U.S. and China have in common regarding nuclear issues. Whether or not we are equals, both are established nuclear powers. And whether our nuclear doctrine is one of strategic ambiguity or no first use, we both consider nuclear weapons to be a useful deterrent and a weapon of last resort. The security and reliability of both countries’ nuclear weapons stockpiles is an increasing concern, especially given the testing limitations to which both countries adhere. And, both countries recognize the importance of establishing lines of communication that are reliable in times of crisis.

We also share concerns about the other’s nuclear command and control. Both sides are concerned that there is a blurring of conventional and nuclear responsibilities within nuclear deployments and a devolution of nuclear authority has resulted. Further, both sides question the independence the other country’s military commanders have in executing orders from their leadership.

Given these areas of agreement and mutual concern, there is a wealth of opportunities for China-U.S. collaboration. The following recommendations are intended to make the limitations of the Cold War and “status rising power” constructs self-evident so that a more constructive, mutually beneficial status as partners can be pursued.

China’s modernization isn’t designed to win a war—if we win the US would win, that means China won’t go to war

Ross 9 (Robert, Professor of Political Science, Boston College, and Associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies “ Chinese Security Policy Structure, Power and Politics” 2009 Published by Routledge Google Books,)

Chinese military analysts observe that the destruction of any weak link in advanced technologies can compromise the war-fighting effectiveness of the entire weapon system. They are particularly interested in the use of viruses that can attack computer systems and missiles that can destroy communication nodes, thereby undermining early warning systems and "paralyzing" the enemy's command-and-control facilities. They have also researched such asymmetric strategies as attacking surveillance and communication satellites, including with space-based weapons, and using antiradiation and electromagnetic pulse weapons to degrade radar systems. Ultimately, an attack on an adversary's intelligence system could amount to an "electronic Pearl Harbor" (dianzi Zhenzhugang), destroying the adversary's war-fighting capability. The Chinese motivation for studying these strategics is clear. **None would give China the confidence or capability to launch a war** and risk U.S. intervention. Rather, these are precautionary strategies that could give China additional capabilities should it find itself at war with the United States. These studies examine asymmetric strategies in theory and in the classroom. They do not evaluate such strategies in the context of a war with a superior adversary that is attacking China's command-and-control facilities and its aircraft and naval vessels. At best, these studies reflect the preparation for war, not the planning of one. As Zhang Wannian has explained, "The overall level of China's military equipment is still relatively low, and its high-technology forces are still relatively few. This fundamental situation will not entirely change for a relatively long period. Within this period, if war should happen, China will still have to use inferior equipment to defeat an enemy with superior equipment."Gy China faces daunting obstacles to developing an asymmetric strategy that can level the playing field. To undermine critical U.S. communication technologies and surveillance operations, high-technology military capabilities and considerable funding are needed. Long-range missiles that are effective against mobile maritime targets, sophisticated antisatellite weaponry, and spaced-based weaponry are not within China's reach. Meanwhile, as China advances its offensive asymmetric capabilities, the United States is continuing to develop high-technology counter-measures. It is thus doubtful that China is closing the gap in the offense-defense balance in information warfare. Chinese military analyses stress the "serious challenges" that China faces in developing high-technology weaponry that can degrade U.S. technologies. Given China's significant inferiority in information technologies vis-a-vis the United States, its ability to engage in counterinformation warfare is severely limited. This would be especially true after a **preemptive strike**, which would undermine China's ability to target U.S. information warfare facilities. Even if China launched a successful first strike, its impact on the war would be limited. Because of the large gap in capabilities between China and the United States, China would have difficulty carrying out "hard destruction" iying cuihui) measures, including targeting weaponry on information system hardware. It would be easier for China to use "soft destruction" (man cuihui) measures, such as computer viruses and electronic interference, to attack an adversary's advanced information systems. But penetrating the Pentagon's backbone computer communication systems would be difficult. Moreover, such attacks would not diminish overall U.S. capabilities, China's military analysts acknowledge, because information systems can generally recover from "soft damage" attacks.70 In addition, because the high-technology weaponry and rapid deployment capability of the United States would help to shorten the duration of a war, the opportunities for an inferior power such as China to employ traditional asymmetric strategies-including protracted warfare aimed at sapping the enemy's will—would also be reduced. Most important, a Chinese preemptive strike against U.S. communication systems might degrade U.S. information warfare capabilities, but it would not change the final outcome. The United States would retain superiority in all aspects of warfare in the Taiwan theater. Thus, asymmetric strategies cannot address China's fundamental deterrence problem: The United States would retain its war-winning capability, and China would still confront high expected costs from the combination of credible U.S. intervention in a mainland-Taiwan conflict war and the resulting high costs to high-value Chinese targets.

#### China NFU resilient

Hui Zhang 5-22-2013; Hui Zhang, a physicist, is leading a research initiative on China's nuclear policies for the Managing the Atom Project in Harvard Kennedy School' s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “China’s No-First-Use Policy Promotes Nuclear Disarmament” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/05/22/chinas-no-first-use-policy-promotes-nuclear-disarmament/>

“[China] keeps an appropriate level of readiness in peacetime… If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the PLASAF will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack either independently or together with the nuclear forces of other services.” It should be noted that the term “nuclear counterattack” in the context of China’s nuclear strategy generally means “nuclear retaliation to a first nuclear strike” or “second nuclear strike.” Many experts and scholars are suspicious of China’s no-first-use pledge, with the Pentagon’s 2013 annual report on the Chinese military calling it ambiguous. But China’s nuclear force posture has all the features of a meaningful no-first-use policy. It has a much smaller and simpler arsenal with a much lower alert status than required for a first-use option.

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### 2NC Ground

Ground – troops are the true controversy

Lorber, JD University of Pennsylvania, January 2013

(Eric, “Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?” 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961, Lexis)

The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with **sending U.S.** troops **into harm's way**." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, **Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops** to Southeast Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained **deployment of U.S. personnel**, not weapons, **into hostilities**.

### Limits

#### Restrictions on war powers could include restrictions on any weapons system – nuclear weapons, land mine bans, cluster bombs, chemical weapons – it’s why we need a ‘human’ limit

Lobel, 8 - Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School (Jules, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War” 392 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:391, <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel_.pdf>)

The third theory—based on the distinction between general rules and specific tactics—also has surface appeal, but is unworkable when applied to specific issues because the line between policy and tactic is too amorphous and hazy to be useful in real world situations. For example, how does one decide whether the use of waterboarding as a technique of interrogation is a policy or specific tactic? Even if it is arguably a specific tactic, Congress could certainly prohibit that tactic as antithetical to a policy prohibiting cruel and inhumane treatment. So too, President Bush’s surge strategy in Iraq could be viewed as a tactic to promote a more stable Iraq, or as a general policy which Congress should be able to limit through use of its funding power. Congress can limit tactical decisions to use particular weapons such as chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, or cluster bombs by forbidding the production or use of such weapons, or simply refusing to fund them.42 Congress could also, however, enact more limited and specific restrictions to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons or land mines in a particular conflict or even a particular theater of war. Indeed, most specific tactics could be permitted or prohibited by a rule. In short, the distinctions between strategies and tactics, rules and detailed instructions, or policies and tactics are simply labels which are virtually indistinguishable. Labeling an activity with one of these terms is largely a distinction without a difference. Accordingly, these labels are not helpful to the real problem of determining the respective powers of Congress and the President.43

#### Broad interpretations cause unmanageable research burdens

Taylor III, now a JD from William and Mary, 2005

(Jarred, “Searching for a More Perfect Union,” https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ypiOXjRVPWzNxDsFVJ0S1n-QfIGtXzp7Y59meEwd-bE/edit?hl=en\_US)

**It would take even the most seasoned scholar years of research and hundreds of pages to** adequately **analyze** the development of **any presidential power** over the course of American history; **war power is** certainly **no exception**. Every President since George Washington has interpreted the martial prerogatives of his office in different ways, and most have set some sort of precedent for succeeding officeholders. Nevertheless, some of the major changes in executive military power bear highlighting.

### Topic Coherence

#### Topic coherence – if their interpretation is correct, then including ‘offensive cyber operations’ in the topic would be redundant and unnecessary, since cyber command falls under the uniformed services – this means their interpretation isn’t predictable

**USSTRATCOM, 13** (“U.S. Cyber Command” current as of August, http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber\_Command/)

USCYBERCOM is a sub-unified command subordinate to U. S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Service elements include: Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER); Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER); Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM); and Marine Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER). The Command is also standing up dedicated Cyber Mission Teams to accomplish the three elements of our mission.

### AT: Reasonability

#### Reasonability is impossible – it’s arbitrary and undermines research and preparation

Resnick, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, ‘1

(Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

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### 2NC AT: General Congress Key

The NFU is the relevant internal link, not the actor

Lawrence J. Korb, Senior Fellow at Center for American Progress, and Alexander Rothman, Center for American Progress, 2012, No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 68(2) 34–42

No-first-use and the global nonproliferation regime

Given the volatile situation in South Asia, think tanks and major international media outlets have written and broadcast repeatedly and at length on efforts to prevent a war in South Asia.2 But there’s been a stunning lack of attention to containment, should diplomacy fail and a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan break out. This attention deficit reveals and reflects a gap in current US nonproliferation policy and the international nonproliferation regime. Since the 1960s, US nonproliferation efforts have largely come in two forms: The United States has worked to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to new nations through the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and it has worked to reduce its own massive nuclear stockpile through bilateral arms negotiations with Russia. The United States has, however, historically resisted international agreements that regulate the use of nuclear weapons in combat.3 If the United States wants to truly minimize the chances of a nuclear war on the Indian subcontinent--and to contain such a war, were it to break out--it is time for this opposition to end. The United States should adopt a no-first-use policy and aim to make it universal through negotiations to ban the first use of nuclear weapons with the five nuclear weapons states that are signatories of the NPT--the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom. If these negotiations are successful, the United States and international community can work to bring the three de facto nuclear weapons states--India, Pakistan, and Israel--into the agreement. Bilateral or multilateral agreements governing the use of nuclear weapons in combat--specifically, pledges not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict--would decrease the likelihood that a conflict originating between India and Pakistan could spin out of control. For example, should China side with Pakistan in a conflict with India, a Chinese no-first-use pledge would be an incentive for it to resolve the conflict through conventional means, if at all possible. And India, the nuclear arsenal of which is far less advanced than that of China, would have a strong incentive to keep the conflict conventional, knowing China will not resort to nuclear weapons unless India does first. A no-first-use policy would also help the United States implement its nonproliferation agenda, promote stability between nuclear weapons states, and deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons in US defense policy, all while actually increasing Americans’ security. A pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons would allow the United States to reclaim the moral high ground it lost when it failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, thereby giving Washington the leverage to lead international efforts to prevent nations from developing nuclear weapons.

Self-restraint alone creates a credible signal

Eric Posner, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School, and Adrian Vermeule, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, 2007, The Credible Executive, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 865

Our aim in this Article is to identify this dilemma of credibility that afflicts the well-motivated executive and to propose mechanisms for ameliorating it. We focus on emergencies and national security but cast the analysis within a broader framework. Our basic claim is that the credibility dilemma can be addressed by executive signaling. Without any new constitutional amendments, statutes, or legislative action, law and executive practice already contain resources to allow a well-motivated executive to send a credible signal of his motivations, committing to use increased discretion in public-spirited ways. By tying policies to institutional mechanisms that impose heavier costs on ill-motivated actors than on well-motivated ones, the well-motivated executive can credibly signal his good intentions and thus persuade voters that his policies are those that voters would want if fully informed. We focus particularly on mechanisms of executive self-binding that send a signal of credibility by committing presidents to actions or policies that only a well-motivated president would adopt.

Declaratory policy solves

Scott Sagan, Stanford University, 2009, The Case for No First Use, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22534/51-3\_12\_Sagan\_author\_proof.pdf

Declaratory policy and public documents outlining US nuclear-weapons doctrine – such as unclassified versions of a nuclear posture review – serve six related purposes. Firstly, they provide intellectual background for the classified guidance given to military leaders, identifying the geopolitical context and assumptions that they should use when developing operational war plans and weapons-alert procedures, and, more indirectly, when developing future procurement requirements. The classified guidance and resulting war plans may not always fully reflect the expectations of senior civilian authorities, but stated declaratory policy is rarely completely inconsistent with classified nuclear doctrine.7 Indeed, senior and junior military officers Statements routinely read and refer to public declaratory policy to help make sense of the more complex and classified set of plans they are tasked to develop. Secondly, can influence the such doctrinal statements are meant to shape the subsequent public debate in the US Congress and broader body politic about the adequacy of the consequencesof current nuclear arsenal, about potential armscontrol agreements or weapons reductions, and future weapons-development programmes. These first two purposes can be seen as instrumental goals; they are means by which the four major substantive objectives of enhancing deterrence, reassurance, counter-terrorism and nonproliferation can best be achieved. Nuclear declaratory policy is meant to enhance deterrence of potential adversaries by providing a signal of the intentions, options and proclivities of the US government in different crisis and war-time scenarios. Such signals are similarly meant to enhance reassurance of allies. Declaratory policy can indirectly influence the likelihood of nuclear terrorism by dissuading governments or individuals from providing nuclear weapons or materials to terrorist organisations and by making terrorist use of a nuclear weapon appear immoral and illegitimate to some individuals who might otherwise support the terrorists’ goals. Finally, statements about doctrine can influence both the likelihood and consequences of nuclear proliferation about doctrine likelihood and proliferation by helping shape global norms about reasonable and legitimate potential uses of nuclear weapons. These norms can in turn influence internal debates in new and potential nuclear-weapons states about their own nuclear doctrines or potential nuclear-weapons acquisition.

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### 2NC Perception Solvency

#### Presidential commitments credible

Marvin Kalb 13, Nonresident Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy, James Clark Welling Presidential Fellow, The George Washington University Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice (Emeritus), Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2013, "The Road to War," book,pg. 7-8, www.brookings.edu/~/media/press/books/2013/theroadtowar/theroadtowar\_samplechapter.pdf

As we learned in Vietnam and in the broader Middle East, a presidential commitment could lead to war, based on miscalculation, misjudgment, or mistrust. It could also lead to reconciliation. We live in a world of uncertainty, where even the word of a president is now questioned in wider circles of critical commentary. On domestic policy, Washington often resembles a political circus detached from reason and responsibility. But on foreign policy, when an international crisis erupts and some degree of global leadership is required, the word or commitment of an American president still represents the gold standard, even if the gold does not glitter as once it did.

Executive NFU declaration solves the 1AC internal links

Harold A. Feiveson, senior research scientist, and co-director of the Program on Science and Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and Ernst Jan Hogendoorn is a Ph.D. student at the Woodrow Wilson School, 2003, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/102feiv.pdf

Countries advocating a legally binding no-first-use commitment emphasize that the commitment should go beyond simple declarations of intent, which could be unilaterally revoked. Rather, the commitments should involve something more, possibly embedded in a protocol of some kind to the NPT, a new treaty, or a UN Security Council resolution. There would be great value in such a commitment regardless of the exact form it would take. Nevertheless, the primary focus of this viewpoint is not this type of legally binding commitment, but rather the declaratory policy of the nuclear weapon states themselves, especially the United States. Along with the distinction between legally binding and declaratory commitments, there is also the question of whether the commitments should be directed only to non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT, thereby giving further incentives to nonparties, such as India, Pakistan, and Israel, to join the NPT as non-nuclearweapon states. With this question too, the distinction between legally binding and declaratory commitments is relevant. And a strong case may be made for extending legally binding commitments directly to the non-nuclearweapon state parties to the NPT. But for declaratory policies more generally (considering first the United States alone), in our view, the simplest, most direct, and most powerful approach is an unambiguous U.S. commitment not to use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances. The present formulation focusing on pledges to non-nuclear-weapon states may have seemed prudent when we were devising ways to persuade non-nuclear countries to agree to an indefinite extension of the NPT, or when we were concerned with Soviet aggression in Europe or elsewhere. But, such an approach is no longer necessary. To hold open the option for nuclear use against another nuclear weapon state is unnecessary and awkward, at a time when the United States is drawing closer to Russia and China, and U.S. relationships with India, Pakistan, or Israel are not conflictual. Even if not legally binding, strong, unhedged no-first-use commitments by the United States and other nuclear weapon states would strengthen the nonproliferation regime, and possibly also help set the stage for later, more binding, commitments. It would be valuable for strong no-first-use commitments to be made by all the nuclear-weapon states, and one would hope that such commitments would follow a U.S. lead. But there is no reason for the United States to insist upon an international agreement before acting. The United States has undertaken unilateral initiatives in the past with the hope, later proven, that other states would follow suit—the most recent example being the 1991 decision by President George H.W. Bush to withdraw most U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from active deployment. In the case of a no-first-use pledge, a unilateral declaration by the United States would greatly increase pressure on other nuclear weapons states also to commit to no first use of nuclear weapons.

### 2NC NPT

The CP is sufficient to align the US with NPT commitments

Lawrence J. Korb, Senior Fellow at Center for American Progress, and Alexander Rothman, Center for American Progress, 2012, No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 68(2) 34–42

A US decision to declare a no-first-use policy would have benefits that extend far beyond South Asia. Such a policy would dramatically strengthen America’s arms control credentials, giving the US government the moral authority to push for stronger controls on weapons-usable nuclear technology and material. Also, efforts to negotiate a multilateral agreement banning the first use of nuclear weapons would inject life into the global nonproliferation regime. The NPT is based on a compact between the nuclear and non-nuclear states. The non-nuclear states pledged to refrain from developing a nuclear weapons capacity, and in return, the states that already possessed nuclear weapons in 1968--the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia--agreed to work toward Ògeneral and complete disarmament.Ó4 But the United States still owns the largest and most advanced arsenal in the world. To effectively pressure the non-nuclear states to live up to their NPT commitments, it is important that the United States clearly demonstrate its efforts to fulfill its own. Declaring a policy of no-first-use would go far in that direction. Moreover, reassuring other countries that they are safe from a US nuclear attack would reduce pressure for them to acquire a nuclear deterrent.

### 2NC – Do both

#### CP preserves political capital - avoids having to rally and compromise

Howell-Harvard-05

(William, Associate Prof @ Harvard, “Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview”, September 2005, Presidential Quarterly, <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2005.00258.x>)

The actions that Bush and his modern predecessors have taken by fiat do not fit easily within a theoretical framework of executive power that emphasizes weakness and dependence, and offers as recourse only persuasion. For at least two reasons, the ability to act unilaterally is conceptually distinct from the array of powers presidents rely upon within a bargaining framework. First, **when presidents act unilaterally, they move policy first and thereby place upon Congress and the courts the burden of revising a new political landscape.** If they choose not to retaliate, either by passing a law or ruling against the president, then the president's order stands. Only by taking (or credibly threatening to take) positive action can either adjoining institution limit the president's unilateral powers. Second, when the president acts unilaterally, he acts alone. Now of course, he relies upon numerous advisers to formulate the policy, to devise ways of protecting it against congressional or judicial encroachment, and to oversee its implementation (more on this below). **But in order to issue the actual policy, the president need not rally majorities, compromise with adversaries, or wait for some interest group to bring a case to court. The president, instead, can strike out on his own**. Doing so**, the modern president is in a unique position to lead, to break through the stasis that pervades the federal government, and to impose his will in new areas of governance.**

#### Empirically true

Warshaw-prof poli sci, Gettysburg-06

(Shirley Anne, Prof of Pol. Science @ Gettysburg College, “Administrative Strategies of President George W. Bush” Extensions Journal, Spring 2006, <http://www.ou.edu/special/albertctr/extensions/spring2006/Warshaw.pdf>)

However, in recent administrations, particularly **since the Reagan administration**, **presidents have often bypassed Congress using administrative actions. They have opted for a strategy through administrative actions that is less time-consuming and clearly** less demanding of their political capital**.** Using an array of both formal and informal executive powers, **presidents have effectively directed the executive departments to implement policy without any requisite congressional authorization**. In effect, presidents have been able to govern without Congress. **The arsenal** of administrative actions available to presidents **includes the power of appointment, perhaps the most important of the arsenal, executive orders**, executive agreements, proclamations, signing statements, and a host of national security directives.1 More than any past president, George W. Bush has utilized administrative actions as his primary tool for governance.

### \*\*\*Threats

### You blow it off we blow it up

#### Turn – crisis stability – impact is war with China

**Bolkcom et al., Congressional Research Service, 2006**

(Christopher, “US Conventional Forces and Nuclear Deterrence: A China Case Study”, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33607.pdf>, ldg)

While these new conventional weapons might enhance deterrence, they might also detract from crisis stability if a conflict were to occur. For example, in Scenario C (combined arms attack), neither U.S. nor Chinese nuclear forces appear postured in a way that would exacerbate a crisis over Taiwan. Neither is vulnerable to a first strike from the other. However, the same may not be true of conventional forces. China may believe that its forces are vulnerable to an attack by either Taiwan or the United States., and that such an attack is about to occur. It may then believe that, in spite of the risk of escalation and possible attacks (conventional or nuclear) on its own territory, that it would be better off initiating the conflict during the crisis. In essence, then, the U.S. ability to defend Taiwan by attacking targets, especially “centers of gravity,” in China could actually make a crisis worse, and could spur China to begin or expand its attack on Taiwan. It can also be argued that potent conventional forces, those that truly overmatch China’s defenses, may weaken deterrence. As described in the background section of this report, during the Cold War, relatively weak U.S. conventional forces were viewed by many as consistent with strong deterrence because the United States would have to quickly fall back on nuclear weapons if attacked by more potent Warsaw Pact forces in Europe.

### Link – EXTN

#### The link is linear – eliminating missions causes corresponding conventional upgrades that risk prolif

**Gerson, Center for Naval Analyses research analyst, 2009**

(Michael, “Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age”, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/09autumn/gerson.pdf>, ldg)

This incentive for nuclear acquisition underscores the continued necessity of nuclear deterrence as long as nuclear weapons exist. As the United States seeks to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons by strengthening conventional forces, it has to also work to offset the asymmetric options used to balance against its conventional power. Consequently, as the United States expands the role of conventional capabilities in deterrence, a credible nuclear deterrent is still required, at least for the foreseeable future, to help convince current and potential adversaries that nuclear weapons are not an effective tool to restore freedom-of-action or gain coercive leverage over its neighbors or the United States. In his 5 April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama stated that the United States intends to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” This reduction, if achieved, does not signify the beginning of unilateral nuclear disarmament. The President was careful to note that nuclear deterrence would be necessary as long as other nations possess nuclear weapons, and that the goal of a nuclear-free world “will not be reached quickly, perhaps not in my lifetime.” A reduction in the role that nuclear weapons play in America’s national security strategy requires a corresponding increase in conventional capabilities. Whereas nuclear weapons dominated the research and debate on deterrence in the twentieth century, conventional weapons will likely occupy a significant portion of the discourse in the new century.

#### Turn—conventional reliance

Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala 2013; Monterey Institute of International Studies, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “ADVANCED US CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT”, The Nonproliferation Review, 20:1, 107-122, DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2012.761790

While the idea of increasing the role of advanced conventional weaponry as a component of US national security thinking and practice is not new, Obama is the first president to strongly link these plans with the goal of pursuing a world free from nuclear weapons.3 As a result, the administration’s domestic policy focus must also take into consideration the international impact of the disarmament agenda on the major military fault lines in key US nuclear relationships with Russia, China, and other nuclear weapon states. When the dynamics of these relationships are considered, the Obama plan to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons through\*at least in part\*a greater role for advanced conventional weaponry in order to foster larger nuclear reductions appears unlikely to succeed. The central problem is that US superiority in advanced conventional weaponry makes it very difficult for any US rival to agree to work toward a nuclear-free world when such a move\*already made difficult by existing conventional imbalances\* will magnify US power. More specifically, the close link between nuclear reductions and increases in conventional capabilities essentially works to decrease US vulnerability in a nuclear disarmed world, while at the same time increasing the vulnerability of its current or future rivals and adversaries. As the former US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has written, ‘‘U.S. conventional power-projection capability and the concern that it may be used to intimidate, attack, or overthrow regimes’’ is far more important in terms of driving proliferation and increasing Russian and Chinese reliance on nuclear weapons than ‘‘fear of U.S. nuclear capability or the content of U.S. nuclear policy.’’4As such, a growing role for advanced conventional weaponry in US national security thinking\*even if it helps to facilitate US nuclear reductions\*appears likely to make Obama’s quest for global zero far more difficult, and perhaps impossible.5’

### \*\*\*China

### 2NC No China Mod

#### Changes in US policy are irrelevant

Bruce M. Sugden 2008; defense analyst in the Washington, DC area. He does consulting for the Department of Defense and commercial clients on combating weapons of mass destruction, future global strike force structure alternatives, nuclear policy and strategy, and emerging deterrence requirements and technology issues. He earned master's degrees in international relations and public policy studies at the University of Chicago and served for six years in the U.S. Air Force as a missile launch officer; ASSESSING THE STRATEGIC HORIZON; Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, November 2008

While U.S. nuclear policy is certainly a major consideration in Russian and Chinese nuclear strategic thought, there is mixed evidence regarding it as a strong causal factor across cases of nuclear proliferation over the past twenty years. First, Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear weapons tests were based heavily on its perception of India as a threat.14 Second, in 2004, the Central Intelligence Agency’s special advisor report on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program assessed that ‘‘Iran was the pre-eminent motivator’’ underlying Iraq’s latent WMD program.15 Subordinate reasons for Iraq’s program were to balance against Israel and wield influence throughout the Arab world. Third, although the case of India shows some evidence that states might link their proliferation efforts to the connection between U.S. nuclear policy\*and the policies of other nuclear states recognized by the NPT\*and the status and international prestige of being a great power, some analysts disagree on the relative causal weight of factors behind India’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. For example, in the 1970s Paul Power showed that the leadership of India viewed the NPT as a discriminatory treaty that produced a monopoly of power and failed to prevent the growth of existing nuclear arsenals.16 Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai said that India would sign the NPT only if the other nuclear weapon states destroyed their arsenals.17 In 1998, following India’s detonation of nuclear devices, T.V. Paul assigned primary causal weight to India’s perception of NPT-recognized nuclear states as a privileged class in international politics. Their unwillingness to recognize India as an equal exacerbated the perception.18 In 1999, Sumit Ganguly argued that three factors were behind India’s 1998 nuclear tests: scientific advances in India’s nuclear research and development program; ideological and domestic political influences that were constrained by national security considerations; and perceived security threats in the absence of security assurances from the NPT recognized nuclear states.19 Rodney Jones, however, disagrees with Ganguly’s analysis. Jones argues that India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which directed the nuclear tests, sought to raise India’s global status through the tests to improve the BJP’s political popularity.20 Furthermore, nuclear reversals have occurred despite the largely static nature of U.S. nuclear policy at the time of the reversals. Several states\*Argentina, Brazil, and Egypt, for example\*tried to develop nuclear weapons programs but then gave up.

#### No China mod

CEWCES 10-9-2012; Bond University Center for East-East Cultural and Economic Studies, “Nuclear complexity in the Third Nuclear Age” <http://cewces.wordpress.com/2012/10/09/nuclear-complexity-in-the-third-nuclear-age/>

So when you examine China’s nuclear forces, with a low number of nuclear warheads in comparison to the United States and Russia, and older delivery systems, the Chinese nuclear weapons capability and posture is not that threatening. This is reinforced by China’s nuclear posture, which remains minimum deterrence and no-first-use. The modernization described above will ensure that it remains a credible deterrent, as well as give China the potential to move from a basis of minimum deterrent / no first use, to a more robust nuclear posture in the future. The key question to consider is why would it choose to make such a change? A number of factors are emerging which could promote significant changes in both the size and role of China’s nuclear forces, and will demand greater attention by Western policy makers. Of key significance to China is ensuring the survivability and maintaining the credibility of their nuclear deterrent in the face of a range of looming challenges. Looking from the perspective from Beijing, China faces the United States, which although currently de-emphasizing the role of nuclear forces and seeking to significantly reduce the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal under the Obama Administration, is also maintaining a commitment to sustaining its own credible nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. This means that the aging nuclear delivery systems, as well as infrastructure to sustain the US nuclear weapons complex, will need to be modernized sooner rather than later to avoid undermining the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent.

### 2NC No Taiwan war

#### Won’t go nuclear

**Pike 11** – last modified 5/7/2011(John, manager, Global Security, China’s Options in the Taiwan Confrontation, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/taiwan-prc.htm)

China would almost certainly not contemplate a nuclear strike against Taiwan, nor would Beijing embark on a course of action that posed significant risks of the use of nuclear weapons. The mainland's long term goal is to liberate Taiwan, not to obliterate it, and any use of nuclear weapons by China would run a substantial risk of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States. An inability to control escalation beyond "demonstrative" detonations would cause utterly disproportionate destruction.

### 2NC No escalation

No escalation – US wins decisively

AP, 3/9/’11

(“China challenges U.S. edge in Asia-Pacific”)

The U.S. Pacific Command has 325,000 personnel, five aircraft-carrier strike groups, 180 ships and nearly 2,000 aircraft. Tens of thousands of forces stay on China's doorstep at long-established bases in South Korea and Japan.

China's defense spending is still dwarfed by the United States. Even if China really invests twice as much in its military as its official $91.5 billion budget, that would still be only about a quarter of U.S. spending. It has no aircraft carriers and lags the United States in defense technology. Some of its most vaunted recent military advances will take years to reach operation.

For example, China test-flew its stealth fighter in January, months earlier than U.S. intelligence expected, but U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates says China will still only have a couple of hundred of these "fifth-generation" jets by 2025. The United States should have 1,500 by then.

### 2NC Relations Resilient

#### SQ solves every impact and locks in relations

Shambaugh 13—Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the China Policy Program at the George Washington University, a nonresident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies and Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution (7/20/13, David, A Big Step Forward in U.S.-China Relations, www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/07/20/a\_big\_step\_forward\_in\_us-china\_relations\_105332.html)

As a result of the recently concluded U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) the relationship between Washington and Beijing has not only stabilized, but has taken a major step forward-make that major steps. This year's S&ED builds on the new momentum in the relationship spurred by the June presidential summit in Sunnylands, California.¶ The totality of S&ED agreements reached by the two sides July 11-12 is truly impressive-and they outnumber in quantity and quality those reached even during recent presidential state visits (2009 and 2011). The announced agreements-91 on the "strategic track" and a similar number on the "economic track"(although they were not itemized)-are ample testimony to the breadth and depth of the relationship, and they are concrete steps forward in building what Chinese President Xi Jinping has described as building a "new type of major power relations."¶ Of course, the "devil is (always) in the detail" and there may well be a lack of bureaucratic follow-through in implementing such ambitious agreements. In recent years, similar well-intended Joint Statements (2009 and 2011) foundered soon after their issuance and failed to be implemented as intended. This time there seems to be a clearer level of bilateral commitment. A close reading of the strategic track document indicates that the majority of clauses are joint, i.e. "the United States and China affirm their commitment to...). In the past, the language was more often "parallel," i.e. "The United States maintains that...."; "China maintains that..." Such parallel clauses are usually code words for disagreements behind the scenes. This time, much of the language (more notably on the strategic than the economic track) is joint rather than parallel. There are also numerous references that both sides "decided" to undertake various initiatives, while numerous memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and joint "action plans" were agreed and signed. Behind these linguistic nuances lies a new mutual strategic commitment and practical bureaucratic cooperation. ¶The other reason for optimism on implementation is that it appears the two sides have established and expanded the number of joint working groups that will operate throughout the year. New working groups include a Cyber Working Group, U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group, an International Economic Affairs Consultation, a Legal Advisors Consultation, a Dialogue on Global Development, an EcoPartnership Dialogue, an Aviation Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Initiative, and continued rounds of previously established bilateral mechanisms. Meanwhile, other joint dialogues have been upgraded-such as elevating the Counter-terrorism Consultations to the vice-ministerial level and the Energy Policy Dialogue to the ministerial level. Prior to this year's S&ED, the two governments had in existence around 90 such bilateral dialogues and mechanisms-after the meeting they now top 100. More importantly, as noted above, many will now operate year-round rather than once per year or in an episodic fashion. This will provide sustained momentum to the relationship between the annual S&ED and presidential meetings.¶ The sheer scope of topics covered and agreed are testimony to both the breadth and depth of the relationship. This includes security and military affairs, regional and global diplomacy, human rights, legal affairs and law enforcement, nonproliferation and arms control, customs issues and container security, supply chain security, fisheries and forests, wildlife trafficking and illegal logging, law of the sea and polar issues, marine science and meteorology, climate change, air and water quality, public health, development and aid, peacekeeping, nuclear safety, and a variety of energy-related issues. And these are only issues on the strategic track. The economic track also discussed and reached agreements in a wide range of specialized and technical areas as well: exchange rate liberalization, data transparency, global and regional financial stability, multilateral institutional cooperation (particularly in the IMF, APEC, and G-20), trade and foreign investment, intellectual property rights and protection of trade secrets, government procurement, anti-dumping, export credits and financing, market opening and distribution rights, banking regulations, and other issues.¶ My purpose for detailing this list is not to bore the reader, but to provide a full sense of the extraordinary scope of the U.S.-China relationship today. No other inter-governmental relationship in the world comes close to the breadth and depth of issues of mutual concern to both nations and which they are working to address together. The China-EU and China-Russia and U.S.-EU relationships have their own extensive areas of dialogue and bureaucratic interaction-but they both pale in comparison to the institutionalization of U.S.-China relations today.¶ Institutionalization is one of what I call the "two I's" in U.S.-China relations-the other being interdependence. These "two I's" interact with the "two c's" in the relationship: cooperation and competition. Institutionalization is the outgrowth of interdependence and the manifestation of cooperation-and all three elements serve to bufferand limitthe competition in the relationship.To be certain,competition and mistrust do exist-at the strategic, economic, military, diplomatic, political, and ideological levels-will continue to, and are not to be falsely minimized. But, exercises like the S&ED are tangible expressions that the two sides now seek to manage the competition and forge cooperation where possible. That is the best news we have had in U.S.-China relations for several years, and is good news for global stability and development.

### \*\*\*Prolif

### 2NC

#### Evidence is all alarmism

**Krepon, Stimson Center co-founder, 2009**

(Michael, “The mushroom cloud that wasn't: why inflating threats won't reduce them”, Foreign Affairs, 88.3 ebsco, ldg)

Today, as was the case during the Cold War, there is no shortage of nonproliferation specialists predicting impending nuclear disasters. Eighty-five experts polled by Senator Lugar in 2005 estimated that the risk of a WMD attack occurring before 2010 was 50 percent and before 2015, 70 percent. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has set its iconic Doomsday Clock at five minutes to midnight--two minutes closer to Armageddon than it was during the Cuban missile crisis. A bipartisan congressional commission concluded in 2008 that "America's margin of safety is shrinking, not growing" and that "unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013." Graham Allison, one of the commission's members, had warned in 2004 that "the detonation of a nuclear device in an American city is inevitable if the U.S. continues on its present course." And soon after leaving office, former Vice President Dick Cheney warned that there is a "high probability" that terrorists will attempt a catastrophic nuclear or biological attack on the United States in the coming years. These sorts of scary predictions have a basis in reality. After all, Iran has mastered the ability to enrich uranium, is laying the foundation for a nuclear weapons program, and has close ties to terrorist groups; Pakistan is ramping up its capacity to produce plutonium as the central government's influence is waning; and North Korea has a bomb-making capacity, weapons-grade material, and a need for hard currency. Al Qaeda's leaders have sought to acquire and use these weapons, and other extremist groups have an interest in doing so, too. Experts cite such worrisome developments and then use threat inflation to seize the public's attention and to secure sufficient appropriations for their preferred remedies. They, along with government officials, members of Congress, and the intelligence community are all safer warning of great danger than downplaying threats--except when their inflated anxieties facilitate a preventive war based on false premises. The Iraq war notwithstanding, when worst cases do not materialize, those who issued dire warnings can take credit. And if attacks do occur, the alarmists can always say, "I told you so." As real as these threats are, hyping them carries its own risks. Crying wolf too often can lead to complacency when action is needed most. Repeated warnings can also prompt taxpayers and lawmakers to question what was gained from prior investments in reducing threats and so limit appropriations for new ones. This is a major problem, since remedial efforts over short periods of time are insufficient; reducing the nuclear threat requires success over the long haul.

The aff backfires and triggers mistrust

Jeffrey Lewis, Ph.D., New America Foundation Nonproliferation initiative and Nuclear strategy director, 1/4/2009, Declaratory Policy, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2583/declaratory-policy

The Problem With No First Use

I am temperamentally inclined toward a “no first use” pledge. (I don’t think it would be a huge gain for the United States, though nor do I think it is a huge danger.) But it does suffer from one very specific problem. As it happens, I don’t think it would ever be in the interest of the United States would initiate the use of nuclear weapons. The late Michael Quinlan, for instance, once said in a meeting that “We do not foresee first use. We do not expect it. We will do everything in our power by our posture to sustain our expectation. But we cannot guarantee” that a situation will not arise that would force us to consider the first use of nuclear weapons. Sir Michael’s objection, I thought, was quite sensible. Categorical statements are too simplistic for the real world. As a result, others don’t take such pledges seriously. Reassurance must be credible. I often see, in the Chinese case, this particular drawback of a no-first use pledge. Americans and others don’t take it seriously — although I think we should. As a result, Chinese academics and officials often get trapped in silly “what if” games. Take the case of Chu Shulong, a Chinese academic who ended up in Chinese Military Power, for what seems like a relatively innocuous interview: The Director of Tsinghua University’s Institute of Stratgeic Studies, in an interview with a reporter from Da Gong Bao expressed, China’s promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons was extremely clear and firm. As of now, their isn’t the slightest indication that China’s government will let go of this promise. ”(I) have not heard any leader on any occasion state China will change or let go of this position. Never.” At the same time Chu Shulong provided a hypothetical, except in the case of a foreign power launching a full scale war against China, using all of their advanced (precision) weaponry except nuclear weapons, and the Chinese nation were facing the danger of extermination, China may let go of this promise. But he considers the possibility not very great. As a result, Chu Shulong ended up in a box in one edition of Chinese Military Power declaring “China may renounce [no first use] at a time when the country’s fate hangs in the balance.” A very similar thing happened to Sha Zukang regarding Taiwan. This is a basic problem when statements are categorical — it is too easy for someone to use a “ticking time bomb” scenario (or Martians using non-nuclear lasers to incinerate elementary schools) that twist the speaker up in knots. The Chinese official or academic defending “no first use” has to either admit that, in a hot-blooded moment, that Chinese leaders might not be especially scrupulous about observing past statements or lamely repeat “China undertakes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use…” Neither is very appealing. I’ve had several Chinese participants tell me about a recent Track II meeting in Beijing where they explained China’s categorical no-first use pledge. The American participants, to make the classic point, rather clumsily suggested a hypothetical US conventional attack on China’s nuclear forces. The Chinese participants freaked. [Perhaps I should say, “were disturbed.”] The American’s went home satisfied that the Chinese weren’t very serious about no-first use; the Chinese left thinking they had been subjected to a very serious threat of coercion. And perhaps wondering if they should start planning for first-use scenarios. I am repeatedly asked about this interaction and was, again, during my last trip to Beijing. This particular Track II debacle is going to haunt the US-China nuclear dialogue for years. I happen to agree with not using nuclear weapons first, but as a declaratory policy it does suffer from the problem that Sir Michael identified.

#### US won’t exert leadership

Cleary 12

Richard Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30

The cases above offer a common lesson: The U.S., though constrained or empowered by circumstance, can exert considerable sway in nonproliferation matters, **but** often elects not to apply the most powerful tools at its disposal for fear of jeopardizing other objectives. The persistent dilemma of how much to emphasize nonproliferation goals, and at what cost, has contributed to cases of nonproliferation failure. The **inconsistent** or incomplete **application** of U.S. power in nonproliferation cases is most harmful when it gives the impression to a nation that either sharing sensitive technology or developing it is, or will become, acceptable to Washington. **U.S. reticence** historically, with some exceptions, to prioritize nonproliferation—and in so doing reduce the chance of success in these cases—**does not leave room for** great **optimism about future U.S. efforts at persuading countries to forgo nuclear fuel-making**.

#### Prolif will be slow

Tepperman 9 Deputy Editor at Newsweek. Frmr Deputy Managing Editor, Foreign Affairs. LLM, i-law, NYU. MA, jurisprudence, Oxford. (Jonathan, Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb, http://jonathantepperman.com/Welcome\_files/nukes\_Final.pdf)

The risk of an arms race—with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one—is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; that's spread at glacial pace." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors—Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say—might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.

## 1NR

### Conditionality

### AT: CP illegit

### Turns Case

#### 1. Deterrence – China war collapses deterrence – ends the taboo against nuclear weapons and turns the case

Wittner 11-30-11

Lawrence, Professor of History emeritus at SUNY/Albany, Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclear-war-china\_b\_1116556.html

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries international conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China's growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China's claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was "asserting our own position as a Pacific power." But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during their conflict over the future of China's offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would "be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else." Of course, China didn't have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven't been very many -- at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan's foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use "any weapon" in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don't nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn't feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO's strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing "Star Wars" and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive -- and probably unworkable -- military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over 5,000 nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly 300. Moreover, only about 40 of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would "win" any nuclear war with China. But what would that "victory" entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a "nuclear winter" around the globe -- destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars "modernizing" its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

### Trade

#### TPA’s key to prevent backsliding on globalization and protectionism

The Economist 2-22, “How to make the world $600 billion poorer,” 2/22/14 (Print Edition), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21596934-barack-obamas-unwillingness-fight-free-trade-expensive-mistake-how-make-world

IN JULY 2008 Barack Obama, then a candidate for the presidency, declared before an adoring crowd in Berlin that “true partnership and true progress [require] constant work and sustained sacrifice.” So it is with free trade. If not championed by leaders who understand its broad benefits, it will constantly be eroded by narrow economic nationalism. Mr Obama now appears to be surrendering to protectionists within his own party. If he cannot drag Democrats back to their senses, the world will lose its best opportunity in two decades for a burst of liberalisation. It will also be a signal that America is giving up its role as defender of an open global economy in the same way that Mr Obama has retreated in foreign policy.

Mr Obama did little to promote free trade during his first term, but has seemed bolder in his second. He launched America into ambitious new deals with large Pacific economies and the European Union, breathing new life into global trade talks. Momentum built up; the “constant work and sacrifice” paid dividends. Members of the World Trade Organisation agreed on a package of trade reforms in December—the first truly multilateral deal in the organisation’s 20-year history. Diplomats credit the White House’s new resolve for helping to bring stubborn parties to the table. Progress suddenly seemed possible in other areas, such as liberalising trade in services and information technology, and reducing barriers to the exchange of “environmental goods and services”, which would make it cheaper to curb carbon emissions.

First, shoot yourself in the foot. Then repeat…

The hitch is that Congress must approve trade agreements. Previous presidents had the advantage of “fast-track” trade promotion authority, which let them present deals to Congress for a simple yes or no vote. Without it, lawmakers can wreck carefully negotiated deals with toxic amendments. No country would engage in serious talks with America under such circumstances. Fast-track is therefore essential—and elusive. Congress last granted it in 2002; it expired in 2007. The Obama administration blithely asserted that Congress would renew it, but many lawmakers, primarily Democrats, have signed letters opposing it. Harry Reid, the Senate majority leader, has all but ruled out a vote this year. And on February 14th Joe Biden, the vice-president, told a gathering of Democratic leaders that he understood their opposition. The White House appears to have given up with scarcely a fight. A fast-track vote before November’s mid-term elections seems unlikely (see article).

Why panic about this? Tactically, it could just be another piece of Washington politicking: some optimists claim that Congress will return after the mid-terms ready to back fast-track, providing Mr Obama allows some boilerplate language in the bill chiding China for allegedly manipulating its currency. Others wonder whether the trade deals are really so vital. Indeed, the idea that they will not do much to help the economy is one excuse for Democrats undermining their president.

In fact, the deals on the table are big. Reasonable estimates say that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) could boost the world’s annual output by $600 billion—equivalent to adding another Saudi Arabia. Some $200 billion of that would accrue to America. And the actual gains could be even larger. The agreements would clear the way for freer trade in services, which account for most of rich countries’ GDP but only a small share of trade. Opening up trade in services could help reduce the cost of everything from shipping to banking, education and health care. Exposing professional occupations to the same global competition that factory workers have faced for decades could even strike a blow against the income inequality that Mr Obama so often decries.

Tactically, even a short delay could prove fatal to both deals. Pacific negotiations have been extended while America and Japan hammer out compromises on agriculture. Why should Japanese politicians risk infuriating their farmers when any agreement can be torn up on Capitol Hill? The deal with the EU was meant to be done swiftly—perhaps in as little as two years—to keep politics from mucking it up. Europe’s leaders will now doubt America’s commitment, given how feebly Mr Obama has fought for fast-track. Trade sceptics, such as French farmers, are drooling. Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, who is already furious about American spying, may decide that a trade deal is not worth battling for.

The greatest risk of all is that the political momentum in America, having swung against free trade, will be hard to reverse. Some Tea Party Republicans oppose fast-track because they are loth to grant Mr Obama the authority to do anything. Democrats, keen to brand themselves as the anti-inequality party, may find economic nationalism an easy sell on the campaign stump: and, once pledged to that cause in November, candidates will not vote for the opposite in Congress.

And for this Mr Obama deserves some blame. He is far more ardent in bemoaning inequality than in explaining why an American retreat from the world would be the wrong way to address it. He seldom mentions, for example, that cheap imports help the poor by cutting their shopping bills, and so reduce inequality of consumption.

It’s not a zero-sum world

There is nothing inevitable about globalisation. Governments have put up barriers before—with disastrous consequences during the 1930s—and could do so again. So it is alarming when America, the mainstay of an open global economy, gives off isolationist signals. Only recently Congress childishly refused to honour an agreed-upon increase in America’s financial commitment to the International Monetary Fund. The Federal Reserve is pushing forward with new banking regulations that could penalise foreign banks and further Balkanise global finance (see article). Mr Obama continues to delay approval of a critical oil pipeline from Canada, and is slow to grant permits to export American natural gas.

“America cannot turn inward,” the Obama of 2008 said in Berlin. The Obama of 2014 is now responding: “Yes we can.”

#### Free trade prevents multiple scenarios for world war and WMD Terrorism

Panzner-New York Institute of Finance-8

Michael, faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” pg. 136-138

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

### Will Pass – 2NC

#### Capital key-TPP good

**Bower, CSIS Southeast Asia Studies senior advisor, 2-27-14**

(Ernest, “A spring-song for the 'Pacific president'”, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/World/WOR-01-270214.html>, ldg)

During a November 2009 trip to Tokyo, President Barack Obama underlined his intent to lead the United States to new levels of engagement in the Asia-Pacific and harkened back to his upbringing in Indonesia and Hawaii, calling himself the United States' "first Pacific president". As he approaches the spring of 2014, Obama must decide if he will fulfill this legacy. It is not only the president's place in history that is on the line, but the United States' national security and economic future. The geopolitical calculus clearly defines the need for the United States to be comprehensively invested in Asia. But the country is stuck in an anachronistic and self-absorbed political atmosphere, where politicians view words such as "trade", "Asia", and "foreign policy" as negatives that should be avoided. A paradigm shift in US thinking is needed. The United States needs to recognize that the country's jobs, safety, and future are inextricably tied to Asia. The outdated Cold War mindset and myopia choking cogent policymaking in Washington must be overcome. The only way for President Obama to live up to his self-described goal to make the United States a leader in the Asia-Pacific is for him to tell Americans the truth, shift the political rhetoric, and lead. The president holds all the necessary levers to drive this overdue shift, but he needs to act now, not wait until after November's mid-term elections to set a course that will anchor US interests in Asia. The context for the change in thinking has been established. The United States has declared its "pivot" to Asia, now branded as a "rebalancing". The US military has been forthright and relatively efficient in implementing its updated posture in the Indo-Pacific region. Those steps are evident and clear. Now it is necessary to bring trade and people-to-people ties to the table. This historic window will not remain open for long. Most of Asia wants and needs the United States to substantially deepen its engagement across the region. China is the motivating factor behind this strong pull for US engagement. Asian friends and allies want to know that the United States' new focus on the region is sustainable. In this context, words matter. Keen Asian analysts, friends, and competitors are looking for the establishment of a political foundation in the United States that clearly defines US interests in economic growth, security, innovation, and cooperation on global issues in Asia. President Obama can take several steps, starting in the next few months, to accomplish his goals: 1. Talk to Americans about Asia. Before making his April visit to South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the president should begin talking about the importance of Asia to US citizens. And he should do it in US cities like Akron, Des Moines, and Oakland, where economic growth is an existential issue. 2. Spend political capital on Trade Promotion Authority. The United States' partners in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations will not believe Washington is ready to close the trade deal unless the president and senior White House staff knock heads on Capitol Hill to get Trade Promotion Authority. Without it, there is no clear path to ratification of the TPP in Congress. The US economy will wither over time unless the country can help drive economic integration and compete in Asia. The TPP is imperfect, but economically and geo-strategically essential to US national interests. First, the president must work on getting Democratic leaders in Congress aligned with the White House. Second, he must reach out to a pro-trade Republican like Senator Rob Portman to make the case.

#### Obama push key

**Reuters 2-25-14**

(“Democrats must give Obama trade promotion authority”, <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/02/25/give-obama-trade-promotion-authority/>, ldg)

This opportunity can only become reality, however, if the president has the authority to close the deals. Foreign nations won’t put their best offers on the table if they believe Congress will renegotiate an agreement. Trade promotion authority, and the trade agreements it will enable, is the best way to bring down foreign barriers to U.S. products and services. Our market is already largely open to foreign imports. Shouldn’t we demand that other nations return the favor? Fast-tracking trade agreements has another big benefit. It would promote the creation of high-paying, research-intensive jobs in the U.S. by better protecting intellectual property — everything from life-saving medicines to cutting-edge software and computing — of U.S. companies doing business overseas. The president is the only person who can ensure that the United States will keep pace in the global competitive economy. If he is serious about seeing this important legislation passed, he should stop paying lip service to trade promotion authority and pick up the phone and urge Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) and members of Congress to support it.

#### Pushing TPA now

**VerWey, AEI program assistant, 3-1-14**

(John, “Trans-Pacific Partnership in the Balance”, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/trans-pacific-partnership-in-the-balance/>, ldg)

Asserting that the U.S. “cannot afford to stand on the sidelines of trade,” U.S. Vice President Joe Biden penned an op-ed in the Financial Times on Thursday laying out the economic and strategic case for the Obama Administration’s current trade agenda. His comments are part of a larger effort happening in public and behind the scenes as the Administration pushes for the conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in the face of opposition from its own party. Following Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid’s public denial of the Obama Administration’s request for Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the departure of the bill’s primary Democratic sponsor, then-Senator Max Baucus (the new U.S. Ambassador to China), it looked like domestic political considerations had postponed the trade agenda indefinitely. Trade agreements are an unpopular issue for much of the Democratic base and, with the 2014 elections already shaping up as a tough cycle for Democrats in the Senate, many assumed the Majority Leader was seeking to prevent a potentially divisive vote until at least after Election Day. In spite of this, U.S. Trade Representative Mike Froman has continued to meet with key partners in Congress and outside advocacy groups while maintaining a full schedule of meetings with TPP partner nations, some of whom might be tempted to use the current U.S. domestic disagreements as an excuse to drag their heels on outstanding issues. In mid-February, Froman met with Japan’s Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy to address the “differences between the United States and Japan on agriculture and other market access and rules issues.” The current impasse between Washington and Tokyo stems from a lack of market access for U.S. automobiles and several agriculture products that Japan deems “sensitive.” While both parties expressed optimism at the conclusion of these meetings, it is unlikely that the Abe government will make any politically unpopular concessions without a guarantee from the U.S. that the TPP will see a vote in Congress before the election cycle effectively halts Congress’s legislative agenda later this year. Froman followed up these talks with a speech at the left-leaning Center for American Progress three days later that framed the trade agenda as a pro-exports effort to ensure labor and environmental standards. Unions and environmental groups, which have otherwise largely supported Obama Administration initiatives, have criticized the Trade Representative’s negotiations over concerns that the TPP will accelerate the “offshoring” of U.S. manufacturing jobs while providing no new international environmental protections. His comments, which also touched on the need for TPA and announced the creation of a new “Public Interest Trade Advisory Committee,” were intended to allay fears among members of the Administration’s own party regarding the pending free trade agreements. While acknowledging that “Advances in technology and automation, combined with the continued pace of globalization, have increased pressure on wages and the sense that there are fewer opportunities for working Americans,” he went on to contend that “trade, done right, is part of the solution, not part of the problem.” This push continued with a late-February trip to Singapore for the latest round of negotiations between the Ministers and Heads of Delegation for all TPP countries. Though no details were released regarding the specifics of what was accomplished or what issues remain, the leaders expressed commitment to the process and highlighted agreement “on the majority of the landing zones.” Froman will conclude this whirlwind two weeks by meeting with Sen. Mark Warner (D-VA) tomorrow, a key moderate Democrat in the Senate whose support for Trade Promotion Authority will be instrumental to its passage once a vote does come up. This outreach is part of a broader effort by the Office of the United States Trade Representative to educate Members of Congress and their staff on the status of the negotiations and the role of Congress in the process that has seen the USTR participate in more than 1,150 meetings and consultations to date. While the timeline for a vote on TPA remains unclear, the recent public moves by Biden and Froman indicate that the Administration has not given up on pressing for a timely conclusion to the TPP and is in fact probably pushing the agenda more than certain corners of its party would like. Whether this initiative will be effective remains to be seen. However, the Administration’s good faith effort ensures that prospective partner nations in the TPP share in this sense of urgency and continue work to identify outstanding “landing zones” as quickly as possible. Though a follow-up to the February’s Singapore round was not announced, Obama’s trip to Asia in April is widely seen as the next significant deadline for the TPP.

### AT: Japan

#### Japan wants to make a deal-but TPA is key – that will resolve currency manipulation concerns.

**Elliot, Center for Global Development, 3-6-14**

(Kimberly, “Chickens, Eggs, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership”, <http://www.cgdev.org/blog/chickens-eggs-and-trans-pacific-partnership>, ldg)

Still, the impression that I took away from our Tokyo discussions is that Prime Minister Abe is prepared to take on the entrenched interests in Japan and liberalize agricultural trade. But it won’t be easy. Rice is a cultural, as well as dietary, staple in Japan, while the other products raise particular political issues. For example, I learned on my visit that sugar is grown mostly in Okinawa and trade protection for the commodity is part of the political compensation to the island for hosting US military bases. So Japanese negotiators need to appear to be hanging tough, and they need to receive assurances that US negotiators are going to be able to deliver when the time comes. So what assurances can US negotiators offer? In the absence of trade promotion authority1 (TPA), which requires congressional approval, very few. And this is where the chickens and eggs come in (though not literally since poultry is not one of the five sacred products). TPP is the egg, while passage of TPA is the chicken. I heard repeated complaints while in Tokyo that USTR Froman was too inflexible in Singapore, that he wouldn’t give an inch. This inflexibility could be a sign of Froman’s reluctance to make concessions now that could cost him future votes in Congress on TPA. But without a good sense of the US bottom line, Japan does not want to concede something that Froman could pocket now and then up the ante later. And without TPA, Japan, and the other TPP parties, cannot know whether Froman will be able to deliver whatever he eventually promises.

### Link

Plan costs massive capital and destroys focus

Andy Butfoy, senior lecturer in international relations at Monash University, 2009, Obama versus the Pentagon, inside.org.au/obama-versus-the-pentagon/

But what about the guidance the Obama administration gives to the military about the purpose of the nuclear weapons stockpile and how it might be used? In particular, what about first-use? Most of the NPT membership want a clear statement of no-first-use. They want all nuclear threats de-legitimised, and they have no time for Washington’s old claim that its first-use option is a foundation of world order. They have had enough of what they see as American hypocrisy. Pentagon hardliners, and their allies in conservative think-tanks, don’t like what they are hearing. Old-school analysts fear a policy of no-first-use would unravel the world order that has evolved since the 1950s. They worry the result would be to encourage rogue states to push their luck, and possibly to spook countries like Japan into building their own nuclear weapons. This shouldn’t come as a surprise to Obama or anyone else. Although the Pentagon is required to follow presidential instructions, it isn’t the Department of Defense’s job simply to assume that a benign security environment will emerge and make radical disarmament sensible. And part of the Pentagon sees its core business as protecting an existing nuclear order which it views as essential for international stability. Where does all this leave us? For Obama, making large cuts to nuclear force levels will be easy, as everyone agrees the arsenal is too bloated. Just how far the cuts should go is a matter of opinion, although the precise numbers needed are a second-order issue. But abolishing nuclear weapons is impossible for many years to come, so Obama will not invest his limited political capital trying, although he will stress elimination as a long-term aspiration. The most interesting area of potential change concerns the missions assigned to nuclear weapons. This is where the real fight could be. Deciding on the role of the weapons is a more profound issue than whether Obama leaves office overseeing an arsenal of 1000 or 4000 nuclear warheads. The central question is whether or not these weapons should be reined in and kept only to deter nuclear attack by others. Or should they continue to have a wider purpose? Should they continue to be seen as a tool for managing world order, which has meant using them to threaten countries like Iran as a way of underlining US hegemony and, supposedly, providing additional discipline to the international system? Obama apparently believes business as usual is unwise, immoral and unsustainable. One reason for this is that inaction could contribute to the NPT’s disintegration. The treaty is already under pressure, partly because of the collapse of US credibility under the previous administration. Today there is enormous hope that Obama can repair the damage; the sense is that it requires someone of his standing to restore faith in American non-proliferation diplomacy. But this could require knocking into line anyone in the Pentagon continuing to insist that it is useful for the United States to threaten to start a nuclear war. Only time will tell whether Obama has the political room and stamina to do this while also addressing the financial mess, healthcare reform, global warming, and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. •

### AT: Hirsh

#### Winners win is empirically denied---opportunities come they are not created

Jackie Calmes, NYTimes, 11/12/12, In Debt Talks, Obama Is Ready to Go Beyond Beltway, mobile.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/us/politics/legacy-at-stake-obama-plans-broader-push-for-budget-deal.xml

That story line, stoked by Republicans but shared by some Democrats, holds that Mr. Obama is too passive and deferential to Congress, a legislative naïf who does little to nurture personal relationships with potential allies - in short, not a particularly strong leader. Even as voters re-elected Mr. Obama, those who said in surveys afterward that strong leadership was the most important quality for a president overwhelmingly chose Mr. Romney. George C. Edwards III, a leading scholar of the presidency at Texas A & M University who is currently teaching at Oxford University, dismissed such criticisms as shallow and generally wrong. Yet Mr. Edwards, whose book on Mr. Obama's presidency is titled "Overreach," said, "He didn't understand the limits of what he could do." "They thought they could continuously create opportunities and they would succeed, and then there would be more success and more success, and we'd build this advancing-tide theory of legislation," Mr. Edwards said. "And that was very naïve, very silly. Well, they've learned a lot, I think." "Effective leaders," he added, "exploit opportunities rather than create them." The budget showdown is an opportunity. But like many, it holds risks as well as potential rewards. "This election is the second chance to be what he promised in 2008, and that is to break the gridlock in Washington," said Kenneth M. Duberstein, a Reagan White House chief of staff, who voted for Mr. Obama in 2008 and later expressed disappointment. "But it seems like this is a replay of 2009 and 2010, when he had huge majorities in the House and Senate, rather than recognizing that 'we've got to figure out ways to work together and it's not just what I want.' " For now, at least, Republican lawmakers say they may be open to raising the tax bill for some earners. "We can increase revenue without increasing the tax rates on anybody in this country," said Representative Tom Price, Republican of Georgia and a leader of House conservatives, on "Fox News Sunday." "We can lower the rates, broaden the base, close the loopholes." The challenge for Mr. Obama is to use his postelection leverage to persuade Republicans - or to help Speaker John A. Boehner persuade Republicans - that a tax compromise is in their party's political interest since most Americans favor compromise and higher taxes on the wealthy to reduce annual deficits. Some of the business leaders the president will meet with on Wednesday are members of the new Fix the Debt coalition, which has raised about $40 million to urge lawmakers and their constituents to support a plan that combines spending cuts with new revenue. That session will follow Mr. Obama's meeting with labor leaders on Tuesday. His first trip outside Washington to engage the public will come after Thanksgiving, since Mr. Obama is scheduled to leave next weekend on a diplomatic trip to Asia. Travel plans are still sketchy, partly because his December calendar is full of the traditional holiday parties. Democrats said the White House's strategy of focusing both inside and outside of Washington was smart. "You want to avoid getting sucked into the Beltway inside-baseball games," said Joel Johnson, a former adviser in the Clinton White House and the Senate. "You can still work toward solutions, but make sure you get out of Washington while you are doing that." The president must use his leverage soon, some Democrats added, because it could quickly wane as Republicans look to the 2014 midterm elections, when the opposition typically takes seats from the president's party in Congress.

#### Hirsh thinks unpopular policies suck the oxygen out of the room and spill over to other issues even if they win he doesn’t think PC is true

Michael Hirsh, National Journal, 2/7/13, There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207

Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood.

Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said.